The theory of monotone comparative statics and supermodular games is presented as the appropriate tool to model complementarities. The approach, which has not yet been fully incorporated into the standard toolbox of researchers, makes the analysis intuitive and simple, helps in deriving new...

This paper develops a theory of regular Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games. We show that almost all dynamic stochastic games have a finite number of locally isolated Markov perfect equilibria that are all regular. These equilibria are essential and strongly stable. Moreover,...

We study identification in a class of linear rational expectations models. For any given exactly identified model, we provide an algorithm that generates a class of equivalent models that have the same reduced form. We use our algorithm to show that a model proposed by Benhabib and Farmer [1] is...

A number of authors have attempted to test whether the US economy is in a determinate or an indeterminate equilibrium. We argue that to answer this question, one must impose a priori restrictions on lag length that cannot be tested. We provide examples of two economic models. Model 1 displays an...

This Paper studies the optimal policies of borrowers (firms or individuals) who may default subject to default costs, and analyses the asset pricing implications. Borrowers defaulting under adverse economic conditions may, despite incurring default costs, emerge as wealthier than non-borrowers...

This Paper examines characterizations of the dynamics for first and second moments of the one-month interest rate, the 12-month excess bond return and exchange rates. The countries considered are the US, Germany, Japan and the UK. Our tests are based on the implications of multi-country versions...

This paper considers a general class of nonlinear rational-expectations models in which policymakers seek to maximize an objective function that may be household expected utility. We show how to derive a target criterion that is: (i) consistent with the model's structural equations, (ii) strong...

Rational expectations are often used as a strong argument against policy activism, as they may undermine or neutralize the policymaker’s actions. Although this sometimes happens, rational expectations do not always imply policy invariance or ineffectiveness. In fact, in certain circumstances...

In aggregative games, each player's payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players (for example, sum, product or some moment of the distribution of actions). Many common games in industrial organization, political economy, public economics, and...

We study the competitive equilibrium of a market for votes where voters can trade votes for a numeraire before making a decision via majority rule. The choice is binary and the number of supporters of either alternative is known. We identify a sufficient condition guaranteeing the existence of...