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We develop democratic mechanisms where individual utilities are not observable by other people at the legislative stage. We show that an appropriate combination of three rules can yield efficient provision of public projects: first, flexible and double majority rules where the size of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666599
In this Paper, we design democratic constitutions that can transcend the shortcomings of the unanimity rule. The constitution embeds the unanimity rule in a set of virtue-supporting principles: (a) broad packages with many public projects (bundling) are allowed, but can only be proposed once in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791780
We study the incentives of parents to invest in their children when these investments improve their marriage prospects, in a frictionless marriage market with non-transferable utility. Stochastic returns to investment eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria that plagues models with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009246608
in these models. We propose a way to take these pay-offs into account, and find that cooperation as equilibrium of the … parameter space, all cooperation equilibria are strictly risk dominated in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). We derive an … others defect, and argue it is a better measure for the ‘likelihood’ of cooperation than the critical level at which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666887
In this paper we characterize a situation in which non-calculative trust has to play a role in the decision to cooperate. We then analyse the given situation in game theoretical terms and distinguish those aspects of players’ decisions that are cooperative from those that may be interpreted as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792217
Our aim is to explain how a small country can be viable as an international banking center (IBC). We build a model in which mobile investors choose between two banking centers located respectively in a small country and in a large country. These countries compete in two instruments, taxation and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009293664
This paper systematically examines the role of fiscal policy, trade and energy taxes on environmental quality in Europe using disaggregated data for 12 European countries over the 1995-2008 period. It uses a methodology that obtains estimates mostly free of time-varying omitted variable biases....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009278172
Does fiscal consolidation lead to social unrest? Using cross-country evidence for the period 1919 to 2008, we examine the extent to which societies become unstable after budget cuts. The results show a clear correlation between fiscal retrenchment and instability. We test if the relationship...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009201119
The storable votes mechanism is a method of voting for committees that meet periodically to consider a series of binary decisions. Each member is allocated a fixed budget of votes to be cast as desired over the multiple decisions. Voters are induced to spend more votes on those decisions that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662312
We develop a model in which two regional governments compete for a mobile oligopolistic firm by publicly providing local inputs. The central mechanism of our model is the interaction of an agglomeration advantage (partial non-rivalness of the local input) and an agglomeration disadvantage (fixed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666937