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For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex … use of negotiations as a procurement mechanism in private industry. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011096108
than traditional regulation where governments commit to both investment and operation cash-flows. This is especially …The paper studies the impact of government budget constraint in a pure adverse selection problem of monopoly regulation … to regulation is proposed in which firms are free to enter the market and to choose their price and output levels …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067470
When today’s actions can affect tomorrow's value of an asset and when the principal does not have access to hard information, either about productive activity or monitoring activity, two incentive problems must be simultaneously solved: first, the ‘ex-ante’ moral hazard problem of inducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504381
In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008921773
This paper considers the canonical sequential screening model and shows that when the agent has an ex post outside option, the principal does not benefit from eliciting the agent's information sequentially. Unlike in the standard model without ex post outside options, the optimal contract is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009359487
Prizes are often awarded to encourage research on products deemed of vital importance. We present a mechanism which can, in situations where the innovators are better informed about the difficulty of the research, tailor perfectly the expected reward to the expected research costs. The idea is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468629
We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent's ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084403
We formulate and estimate a structural model for travel demand, in which users have heterogeneous preferences and make their transport decisions considering the network congestion. A key component in the model is that users have incomplete information about the preferences of other users in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009493565
Performance indicators are increasingly used to regulate quality in health care and other areas of the public sector. We develop a model of contracting between a purchaser (principal) and a provider (agent) under the following scenarios: a) higher ability increases quality directly and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123654
. Absent regulation, there is a separating equilibrium with voluntary retentions. If funding value is high, banks may instead … generally leads to higher welfare if efficient risk-sharing (bank investment scale) is the dominant consideration, and is always …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024483