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The Ratchet Effect Re-examined: A Learning Perspective

Bhaskar, Venkataraman - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We study dynamic moral hazard where principal and agent are symmetrically uncertain about job difficulty. Since effort is unobserved, shirking leads the principal to believe that the job is hard, increasing the agent's continuation value. So deterring shirking requires steeper incentives, which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083528

Dynamic Moral Hazard, Learning and Belief Manipulation

Bhaskar, Venkataraman - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We study dynamic moral hazard, with symmetric ex ante uncertainty and learning. Unlike Holmstrom's career concerns model, uncertainty pertains to the difficulty of the job rather than the general talent of the agent, so that contracts are required to provide incentives. Since effort is privately...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083746

Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking

Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

away from less easily contractible tasks such as long-term investments, risk management and within-firm cooperation. Under …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083769

Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

The government wants two tasks to be performed. In each task, unobservable effort can be exerted by a wealth-constrained private contractor. If the government faces no binding budget constraints, it is optimal to bundle the tasks. The contractor in charge of both tasks then gets a bonus payment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084088

Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation

Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumer’s problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084241

Delegation and Incentives

Bester, Helmut; Krähmer, Daniel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This paper analyses the relation between authority and incentives. It extends the standard principal--agent model by a project selection stage in which the principal can either delegate the choice of project to the agent or keep the authority. The agent's subsequent choice of effort depends both...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661941

Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave

Englmaier, Florian; Muehlheusser, Gerd; Roider, Andreas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554231

Should a principal hire one agent or two agents to perform two sequential tasks?

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

A principal should hire one agent to perform two sequential tasks when the tasks are conflicting (i.e., a first-stage success makes second-stage effort less effective), while she should hire two different agents when the tasks are synergistic.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008611012

Rotten Kids with Bad Intentions

Netzer, Nick; Schmutzler, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We examine a "Rotten Kid" model (Becker 1974) where a player with social preferences interacts with an egoistic player. We assume that social preferences are intention-based rather than outcome-based. In a very general multi-stage setting we show that any equilibrium must involve mutually unkind...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468559

Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study

Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

cornerstone of contract theory. We have conducted an experiment with 720 participants to explore whether the theoretical insights … are reflected by the behavior of subjects in the laboratory and to what extent deviations from standard theory can be … agency theory is indeed useful to qualitatively predict how variations in the degree of uncertainty affect subjects' behavior …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084433