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Israel, the Palestinian Factions and the Cycle of Violence
Jaeger, David A; Paserman, M. Daniele - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
In this study we extend our previous work to examine the dynamic relationship between violence committed by Palestinian factions and that committed by Israel during the Second Intifada. We find a statistically significant relationship between Israeli fatalities claimed by groups associated with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123813
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The Cycle of Violence? An Empirical Analysis of Fatalities in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict
Jaeger, David A; Paserman, M. Daniele - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
This paper studies the dynamics of violence in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict since the outbreak of the Second (or 'Al-Aqsa') Intifada in September 2000, during which more than 3,300 Palestinians and more than 1,000 Israelis have been killed. The conflict has followed an uneven pattern, with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661712
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Collateral Damage: Trade Disruption and the Economic Impact of War
Glick, Reuven; Taylor, Alan M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
" costs of war, such as lost human capital, as illustrated by case studies of World War I and World War II. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504411
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The Struggle for Palestinian Hearts and Minds: Violence and Public Opinion in the Second Intifada
Jaeger, David A; Klor, Esteban F; Miaari, Sami; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
This paper examines how violence in the Second Intifada influences Palestinian public opinion. Using micro data from a … series of opinion polls linked to data on fatalities, we find that Israeli violence against Palestinians leads them to … to other fatalities. Although overall Israeli fatalities do not seem to affect Palestinian public opinion, when we divide …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791998
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The Economics of the International Arms Trade
Levine, Paul L; Sen, Somnath; Smith, Ron P - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1993
Sales of arms are a significant component of international trade and raise a range of pressing policy issues. After a short review of the market, this paper provides a formal model of the trade which allows for competing, forward-looking suppliers whose welfare depends on both the economic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661900
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The Right Amount of Trust
Butler, Jeff; Giuliano, Paola; Guiso, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
A vast literature has investigated the relationship between trust and aggregate economic performance. We investigate the relationship between individual trust and individual economic performance. We find that individual income is hump-shaped in a measure of intensity of trust beliefs available...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008528520
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Trust and Cheating
Butler, Jeff; Giuliano, Paola; Guiso, Luigi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
When we take a cab we may feel cheated if the driver takes an unnecessarily long route despite the lack of a contract or promise to take the shortest possible path. Is our decision to take the cab affected by our belief that we may end up feeling cheated? Is the behavior of the driver affected...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083918
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Property Crime with Private Protection: A Market-for-Offenses Approach
Hotte, Louis; Valognes, Fabrice; van Ypersele, Tanguy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
We propose a market-for-offenses model of property crime, which explicitly accounts for protection expenditures among heterogeneous individuals. The crime equilibrium is modeled as a free-access equilibrium in which the match between criminals and victims equates the average returns to crime. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504660
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War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict
Rohner, Dominic; Thoenig, Mathias; Zilibotti, Fabrizio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
We construct a dynamic theory of civil conflict hinging on inter-ethnic trust and trade. The model economy is inhabitated by two ethnic groups. Inter-ethnic trade requires imperfectly observed bilateral investments and one group has to form beliefs on the average propensity to trade of the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009003383
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Democratization or Repression?
Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999
Regimes controlled by a rich elite often collapse and make way for democracy amidst widespread social unrest. Such regime changes are often followed by redistribution to the poor at the expense of the former elite. We argue that the reason why the elite may have to resort to full-scale...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666486