Showing 1 - 10 of 434
We study the effects of unequal representation in the interest-group system on the degree of information transmission between a lobbyist and a policy-maker. Employing a dynamic cheap-talk model in which the lobbyist cares instrumentally about his reputation for truth telling, we show that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792547
highly valued by the voters and thus increase the probability of winning the election. Voters can be rational or behavioral …. Our empirical analysis, which uses data from the 2013 National election in Italy---held under closed list proportional …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213305
year preceding their re-election date. Moreover, disputes filed by the U.S. tend to target industries that are important to … swing states in the presidential election. To explain these regularities, we develop a theoretical model in which an … during the re-election campaign provides an advantage over the challenger, who cannot commit to file the dispute if elected …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011276379
This paper provides a direct test of the causal link from electoral rules to economic policy. Our theoretical model delivers unambigous predictions on the interaction between institutions and a time varying event, namely the unemployment rate in pivotal and non-pivotal districts. We use local...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008466353
We develop a general equilibrium analysis of the impact of active labour market policy on unemployment, wages and the welfare of the employed. This framework is used to assess the political support in favour of such policies and to relate it to the working of such policies and other parameters...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662144
, we eliminate a potential source of bias in production-function estimates and generate testable hypotheses on the forces …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666545
', that is, expansionary monetary policy in election years. Third, we observe indications of `political budget cycles', or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666821
Different electoral rules provide different incentives for parties competing for votes to adopt emerging issues. As a result, new societal issues will be integrated at different speeds into the political arena, and ultimately, into policy. In order to study this question formally, I propose an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666941
Competition between opposing lobbies is an important factor in the endogenous determination of trade policy. This paper investigates empirically the consequences of lobbying competition between upstream and downstream producers for trade policy. The theoretical structure underlying the empirical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004991547
In this paper, we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789151