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Prudence in Bargaining: The Effect of Uncertainty on Bargaining Outcomes

White, Lucy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

We investigate the outcome of bargaining when a player’s pay-off from agreement is risky. We find that a risk-averse player typically increases his equilibrium receipts when his pay-off is made risky. This is because the presence of risk makes individuals behave 'more patiently' in bargaining....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666445

The Development of the Division of Power among the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament

Laruelle, Annick; Widgrén, Mika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

Probabilistic measures of a priori voting power are useful tools to asses actors' influence on collective decision-making either for the purpose of designing a voting organ or to model particular policy cases. This paper makes an attempt to reduce a dynamic voting process into a cooperative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114157

R&D Cooperation and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

Carraro, Carlo; Siniscalco, Domenico - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995

International agreements to protect the global environment are typically difficult to reach. In principle they should be profitable for all players involved in the negotiation. Even when they are profitable, however, they are often unstable due to the incentive to free-ride (enjoying the clean...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792083

Incentives and Stability Of International Climate Coalitions: An Integrated Assessment

Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; De Cian, Enrica; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

reducing emissions. We find that only the grand coalition under a specific sets of assumptions finds it optimal to stabilise … GHG concentration below 550 ppm CO2-eq. However, the grand coalition is found not to be stable, not even 'potentially …2-eq. More ambitious targets lead to the collapse of the coalition. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083407

Behind the GATE Experiment: Evidence on Effects of and Rationales for Subsidized Entrepreneurship Training

Fairlie, Robert W; Karlan, Dean S.; Zinman, Jonathan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We use randomized program offers and multiple follow-up survey waves to examine the effects of entrepreneurship training on a broad set of outcomes. Training increases short run business ownership and employment, but there is no evidence of broader or longer run effects. We also test whether...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084448

Social Networks

De Martí, Joan; Zenou, Yves - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We survey the literature on social networks by putting together the economics, sociological and physics/applied mathematics approaches, showing their similarities and differences. We expose, in particular, the two main ways of modeling network formation. While the physics/applied mathematics...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008557014

Do the 'Three-Point Victory' and 'Golden Goal' Rules Make Soccer More Exciting? A Theoretical Analysis of a Simple Game

Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This note argues that a rigorous application of simple game theory may provide unambiguous yet non-trivial theoretical insights about the behaviour of players in simple games. This contrasts with a commonly held view that many predictions in applied game theory are either obvious or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666780

Renegotiation Before Contract Execution

Wambach, Achim - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

By offering or choosing a contract the informed agent might reveal information to the principal which could be used for immediate renegotiation. This is discussed in an axiomatic approach. We show that if, given the revealed information, there exists a contract which is preferred by everyone,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504482

Bargaining in Mergers and Termination Fees

Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Weitzel, Utz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We model takeovers as a bargaining process and explain termination fees for, both, the target and the acquirer, subject to parties’ bargaining power and outside options. In equilibrium, termination fees are offered by firms with outside options in exchange for a greater share of merger...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498188

The Excess Power Puzzle of the EU Budget

Kauppi, Heikki; Widgrén, Mika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

It is a constant topic of debate how the European Union (EU) spends the money it collects from its member states. This paper supports the idea that the EU budget battle involves one-shot games that have persistent impacts on the budget allocations. In one way or the other, the member states are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004972167