We utilize a unique database from a large legal services provider to examine how service quality responds to the firm's available capacity and workload, and to the nature of the firm-client relationship. We develop empirical measures of both the (internal) level of resources available to the...

We take the hierarchical resource allocation model in Van Zandt (2003a) and derive a simpler, reduced-form model of balanced hierarchies. This model uses continuous approximations; we derive bounds on the errors due to these approximations. We then give results that indicate that optimal...

Companion papers develop a model of real-time hierarchical computation of resource allocations by boundedly rational members of an administrative staff. The nodes of a hierarchy are multi-person decision-making units offices. The current Paper uses a reduced form to address specific questions...

When not every facet of a transaction can be contracted upon and transacting parties' payoffs are asymmetric, low-powered incentives for those facets of the transaction that can be contracted upon may be necessary to avoid too large a distortion in those facets that cannot be contracted upon...

A principal chooses one of n=2 projects or an outside option. An agent is privately informed about the projects' benefits and shares the principal's preferences except for not internalizing her value from the outside option. We show that strategic communication is characterized by pandering: the...

This Paper presents a model in which boundedly rational members of an administrative staff calculate resource allocations in real time. We consider a class of hierarchical procedures in which information about payoff functions flows up and is aggregated by a hierarchy, while allocations flow...

This Paper examines optimal incentives and performance measurement in a setting where an agent has specific knowledge about the consequences of their actions for the principal. I study incentive contracts in which the agent’s compensation can be based on both ‘input’ measures closely...

We examine a simple measure of portfolio performance based on prospect theory, which captures not only risk and return but also reflects differential aversion to upside and downside risk. The measure we propose is a ratio of gains to losses, with the gains and losses weighted (if desired) to...

An important lesson from the incentive literature is that explicit incentives may elicit dysfunctional and unintended responses, also known as gaming responses. The existence of these responses, however, is difficult to demonstrate in practice because this behaviour is typically hidden from the...

Non-contractible quality dimensions are at risk of degradation when the provision of public services is privatized. However, privatization may increase quality by fostering performance-improving innovation, particularly if combined with increased competition. We assemble a large data set on...