When stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, relations with social activists may become … increased by the institutionalization of stakeholder protection depriving incumbent CEOs of activists’ support. This finding … provides a rationale for the emergence of specialized institutions (social auditors and ethic indexes) that help firms commit …

viewed as detrimental to shareholders. We also find that there is commonly a big difference between a state's ability to …

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …

This paper explores how motivating an incumbent CEO to make investments that improve the effectiveness of the firm … compensation package (including severance pay) under governance structures that differ in the power that the incumbent CEO has on … the board of directors. We explain why yielding the incumbent CEO some control of the board (entrenchment) can be …

the firm employing them. We first find a very strong and robust correlation between the CEO's network and that of his … hire directors from particular networks, irrespective of the CEO's identity. We then show that the governance of firms run … by former civil servants is relatively worse on many dimensions. Former civil servants are less likely to leave their CEO …

This paper evaluates the welfare implications of front-running by mutual fund managers. It extends the model of Kyle …-tradable or illiquid assets. The insider with trade-information is one of the fund managers. We find that front-running activity …