Showing 1 - 10 of 31
We study two-stage political contests with private entry costs. We show that these political contests could be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504307
We study optimal contest design in situations where the designer can reward high performance agents with positive prizes and punish low performance agents with negative prizes. We link the optimal prize structure to the curvature of distribution of abilities in the population. In particular, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504366
We study all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. The players have the same value for all the certain prizes except for one uncertain prize for which each player has a private value. We characterize the equilibrium strategy and show that if the number of prizes is smaller than the number of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083545
This paper analyzes how all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes can be used to provide effort incentives. We show that wide classes of effort distributions can be implemented as equilibrium outcomes of such games. We also ask how all-pay auctions have to be structured so as to induce high...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084454
We study a three-stage all-pay auction with two players in which the first player to win two matches wins the best-of-three all-pay auction. The players have values of winning the contest and may have also values of losing, the latter depending on the stage in which the contest is decided. It is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661485
We study all-pay contests under incomplete information where the reward is a function of the contestant's type and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661501
We study all-pay contests in which there is a positive probability of a tied outcome. We analyse both one …-stage contests and multi-stage contests with tie-breaks. We demonstrate that in symmetric two-player contests, the designer does not … have an incentive to award a prize in a case of a tie. Consequently, in symmetric multi-stage two-player contests, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661524
We study a sequential two-stage all-pay auction with two identical prizes. In each stage, the players compete for one prize and each player may win either one or two prizes. The designer may impose a cap on the players' bids in each of the stages. We analyze the equilibrium in this sequential...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468581
We study a sequential all-pay auction where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. In the case of two contestants, contestant 1 (the first mover) makes an effort in the first period, while contestant 2 (the second mover)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854484
We study multi-stage sequential all-pay contests (auctions) where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed … multi-stage sequential all-pay contests and analyze the effect of the number of contestants, their types, and their order on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083820