We study the emergence and interaction of red tape and corruption in a principal-bureaucrat-agent hierarchy. The … the social optimum if the bureaucrat in charge of red tape is corrupt. We consider two types of corruption. First, the … bribes to conceal the information produced through red tape. The former kind of corruption tends to reduce red tape, while …

Although the theoretical literature often uses lobbying and corruption synonymously, the empirical literature … associates lobbying with the preferred mean for exerting influence in developed countries and corruption with the preferred one … suggest that (a) lobbying and corruption are fundamentally different, (b) political institutions play a major role in …

model, measure and investigate this process empirically. This paper tries to fill this gap by putting forward theory and …

proposal to legalize paying bribes while increasing fines on accepting bribes. We explore performance as regards corruption … enforcement agencies, and discuss the relevance for fighting other forms of corruption. …

Ukraine face higher effective tax rates, worse official corruption, greater incidence of mafia protection, and have less faith … in the court system. Our firm-level regressions for the three Eastern European countries find that official corruption is …

corruption the preferred one in poor countries. Analyses of their joint effects are understandably rare. This paper provides a … theoretical framework that focus on the relationship between lobbying and corruption (that is, it investigates under what … conditions they are complements or substitutes). The paper also offers novel econometric evidence on lobbying, corruption and …

This paper models corruption as optimal parasitism in organizations where teams of agents are weakly restrained by … principals. Each agent takes on part of the role of principal, choosing how much to invest in policing to repress corruption in … in empirical analyses of corruption, and gives rise to a wide variety of equilibria. Allowing income to co-evolve with …

can countries get trapped in a bribing equilibrium forever? Corruption and lobbying are to some extent substitutes. By …) an equilibrium with corruption discourages firms to invest, (ii) firms bribe if the level of development is low, but (iii … become an equilibrium. The outcome is a poverty trap with pervasive corruption. This poverty trap is more likely if penalties …