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Revealed Group Preferences on Non-Convex Choice Problems.

Ok, E.A.; Zhou, L. - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 1996

This paper studies the conditions under which the basic results of the re vealed preference theory can be established on the domain of choice problems which include non-convex feasible sets, the exercice is closely related to the works of Peters and Wakker (1991) and Bossert (1994).

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005826830

The Choquet Bargaining Solutions

Ok, Efe A.; Zhou, Lin - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 1997

We axiomatically investigate the problem of rationalizing bargaining solutions by social welfare functions that are … theories of collective and individual choice. We refer to bargaining solutions that can be rationalized by Choquet integrals as … Choquet bargaining solutions. Our main result is a complete characterization of Choque bargaining solutions. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005611673

Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions

Brams, S. J.; Jones, M. A.; Kilgour, M. D. - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 2001

Ordinally single-peaked preferences are distinguished from cardinally singlepeaked preferences, in which all players have a similar perception of distances in some one-dimensional ordering. While ordinal single-peakedness can lead to disconnected coalitions that have a "hole" in the ordering,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168642

Voter Sovereignty and Election Outcomes

Brams, S.J.; Sanver, R.M. - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005826813

Fallback Bargaining

Brams, S.J.; Kilgour, D.M. - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 1998

Fallback bargaining is a bargaining procedure under which bargainers begin by indicating their preference rankings over …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005605597

The Paradox of Disconnected Coalitions

Brams, S.J.; Jones, M.A.; Kilgour, D.M. - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005264409

Fair Division: A New Approach to the Spratly Islands Controversy

Brams, Steven J.; Denoon, David - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 1996

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005264471

A Procedure for Divorce Settlements

Brams, Steven J.; Taylor, Alan D. - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 1996

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005826728

The Dynamics of the Northern Ireland Condition

Brams, Steven J.; Togman, Jeffrey M. - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 1996

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005826773

Inequality Averse Collective Choice.

Ok, E.A. - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 1996

The Lorenz-Pareto Optimal Frontier of a collective choice problem indentifies a (usually quite large) subset of all Pareto optimal outcomes which are not inegalitarian according to the Lorenz criterion. We study the basic properties of Lorenz-Pareto optimal choice functions and in particular...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005826798