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COALITION VOTING

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C. - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005826763

On Candidate-Based Analyses of Assembly Elections.

Benoit, J.P.; Kornhauser, L.A. - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 1996

Analyses of assembly elections often assume that voters have well-defined preferences over candidates, even though …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005605647

Approval Voting in Practice

Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C. - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005611676

CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A CUSTOM-DESIGNED ELECTION SYSTEM

Brams, Steven J. - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005264346

Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting

Brams, S.J.; Fishburn, P.C. - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 2003

Approval voting (AV) is a voting system in which voters can vote for, or approve of, as many candidates as they like in … multicandidate elections. In 1987 and 1988, four scientific and engineering societies, collectively comprising several hundred … adopted AV are used to compare theoretical results with experience, including the nature of voting under AV and the kinds of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005826757

Voter Sovereignty and Election Outcomes

Brams, S.J.; Sanver, R.M. - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005826813

Yes-No Voting

Fishburn, Peter C.; Brams, Steven J. - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005605657

Endogenous Lobbying

Felli, L.; Merlo, A. - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 2000

In this paper we endogenize the number and characteristics of lobbies in a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy where citizens can lobby an elected policy-maker. We find that lobbying always matters. That is, lobbying always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. Moreover, only one...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005264298

CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A VOTING SYSTEM TO ELECT A GOVERNING BOARD

Brams, Steven J. - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005264334

Minimal Winning Coalitions in Weighted-Majority Games

Fishburns, Peter C.; Brams, Steven J. - C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, Department of … - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005826788