What we find is that teh match between vulnerability and trust is a key ingredient into what makes a group of workers work well together along with the type of coordination problem that is created by the equilibrium of the incentive scheme.

It is well-known that non-cooperative and cooperative game theory may yield different solutions to games. These differences are particularly dramatic in the case of truels, or three-person duels, in which the players may fire sequentially or simultaneously, and the games may be one-round or...

In his classic novel, Catch-22 (1961), Joseph Heller describes a thoroughly frustrating situation faced by a combat pilot in WWII. This is generalized to a "generic" 2 x 2 strict ordinal game, in which whatever strategy the column player chooses, the best response of the row player inflicts on...

We study the evolution of preferences via payoff monotonic dynamics in strategic environments with and without complete information. It is shown that, with complete information and subgroup matching, empirically plausible interdependent preference relations may entail the local instability of...

A standard assumption in the economic approach to individual decision making is that people have independent preferences. We study equilibria of the classic common pool resource extraction and public good games when some of the players have negatively interdependent preferences while the...

We present a synthesis of the various folk theorems for repeated games.

Political parties in Northern Ireland recently used a divisor method of apportionment to choose, in sequence, ten cabinet ministries. If the parties have complete information about each others' preferences, we show that it may not be rational for them to act sincerely by choosing their...