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Public Goods Games, Altruism, and Evolution

Alger, Ingela - Carleton University, Department of Economics - 2009

altruistic individual is better off materially. Between pairs, individuals in the pair with the highest degree of altruism are … better off materially. I determine the evolutionarily stable degree of altruism, allowing for assortative matching. The … stable degree of altruism is strictly smaller than the degree of assortativity, and it may be negative. It is also increasing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005089374

Ambiguity on audits and cooperation in a public goods game

Dai, Zhixin; Hogarth, Robin M.; Villeval, Marie Claire - HAL - 2014

We investigate the impact of various audit schemes on the future provision of public goods, when contributing less than the average of the group is sanctioned exogenously and the probability of an audit is unknown. We study how individuals update their beliefs about the probability of being...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010899359

Warm-Glow Versus Cold-Prickle: The Effects of Positive and Negative Farming on Cooperation in Experiments.

Andreoni, J. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005443443

Social Fragmentation and Public Goods Revisiting the Olson's Effect in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar

Bros, Catherine - HAL - 2009

A vast recent literature has stressed social fragmentation's negative impact on the provision of public goods. This is a key issue, given that public goods availability has been reckoned as crucial to economic development, while developing countries' societies often exhibit high degrees of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738478

Private Valuation of a Public Good in Three Auction Mechanisms

Dragicevic, Arnaud; Ettinger, David - HAL - 2011

We evaluate the impact of three auction mechanisms--the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism, the second-price auction (SPA), and the random nth-price auction (NPA)--in the measurement of private willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept for a pure public good. Our results show that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010898536

On the Definition of Public Goods. Assessing Richard A. Musgrave's contribution

Demarais-Tremblay, Maxime - HAL - 2014

This paper provides an explanation of the emergence of the standars textbook definition of public goods in the middle of the 20th century. It focuses on Richard Musgrave's contribution in defining public goods as non-rival and non-excludable - from 1939 to 1969. Although Samuelson's mathematical...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011026084

Edgeworth and Lindahl-Foley equilibria of a general equilibrium model with private provision of pure public goods

Florenzano, Monique; Mercato, Elena L. Del - HAL - 2006

In this paper, we propose a definition of Edgeworth equilibrium for a private ownership production economy with (possibly infinitely) many private goods and a finite number of pure public goods. We show that Edgeworth equilibria exist whatever be the dimension of the private goods space, and can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010750403

General equilibrium

Florenzano, Monique - HAL - 2007

Unlike partial equilibrium analysis which study the equilibrium of a particular market under the clause "ceteris paribus" that revenues and prices on the other markets stay approximately unaffected, the ambition of a general equilibrium model is to analyze the simultaneous equilibrium in all...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010750449

Social Welfare and Collective Goods Coercion in Public Economics

Winer, Stanley L.; Tridimas, George; Hettich, Walter - Carleton University, Department of Economics - 2007

This paper develops and expanded framework for social planning in which coercion stemming from the provision of public goods is explicitly acknowledged. Key issues concern the precise definition of coercion, its difference from redistribtion, and its incorporation into social welfare...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004961535

Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Application to the United States, 1973 and 1983

Hotte, Louis; Winer, Stanley L. - Carleton University, Department of Economics - 2000

We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model of a competitive polical economy in which the economic interests of groups of voters and their effective influcence on equilibrium policy outcomes can be explicitely distinguished and computed.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627013