Showing 1 - 10 of 115
Stable matchings may fail to exist in the roommate matching problem, both when utility is transferable and when it is not. We show that when utility is transferable, the existence of a stable matching is restored when there is an even number of individuals of indistinguishable characteristics...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877757
Although many real bargaining situations involve more than two people, much of the theoretical and experimental research concentrates on the two player situation. We study the simplest possible extension: four people (two two-person groups) of different patience bargain with each other....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877783
We model centralized school matching as a second stage of a simple Tiebout-model and show that the two most discussed mechanisms, the deferred acceptance and the Boston algorithm, both produce inefficient outcomes and that the Boston mechanism is more efficient than deferred acceptance. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010948854
To encourage diversity, branches may vary contracts' priorities across slots. The agents who match to branches, however, have preferences only over match partners and contractual terms. Ad hoc approaches to resolving agents' indifferences across slots in the Chicago and Boston school choice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019857
We show that an ambiguity in setting the primitives of the matching with contracts model by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) has serious implications for the model. Of the two ways to clear the ambiguity, the first (and what we consider more "clean") remedy renders several of the results of the paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019859
We show that Hatfield and Kojima (2010) inherits a critical ambiguity from its predecessor Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and clearing this ambiguity has strong implications for the paper. Of the two potential remedies, the first one results in the failure of all theorems except one in the absence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019861
End-stage renal disease (ESRD) is the ninth-leading cause of death in the U.S. Transplantation is the most viable renal replacement therapy for ESRD patients, but there is a severe disparity between the demand for kidneys for transplantation and the supply. This shortage is further complicated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009318155
Motivated by historically low retention rates of graduates at USMA and ROTC, the Army recently introduced branch-for-service incentives programs where cadets could bid an additional three years of active duty service obligation to obtain higher priority for their desired career specialties. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009319238
Although a pilot national live-donor kidney exchange program was recently launched in the US, the kidney shortage is increasing faster than ever. A new solution paradigm is able to incorporate compatible pairs in exchange. In this paper, we consider an exchange framework that has both compatible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009319240
Branch selection is a key decision in a cadet's military career. Cadets at USMA can increase their branch priorities at a fraction of slots by extending their service agreement. This real-life matching problem fills an important gap in market design literature. Although priorities fail a key...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009319241