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Core-stable Rings in Auctions with Independent Private Values
Biran, Omer; Forges, Francoise - CESifo - 2010
characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583724
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Explicit vs. tacit collusion: The impact of communication in oligopoly experiments
Fonseca, Miguel A.; Normann, Hans-Theo - Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), … - 2012
We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956703
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Endogenous cartel formation: Experimental evidence
Fonseca, Miguel A.; Normann, Hans-Theo - Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), … - 2014
In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that four-firm industries form cartels more often than duopolies because they gain less from a hysteresis effect after cartel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956705
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International Antitrust Enforcement and Multi-Market Contact
Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko - CESifo - 2009
antitrust authorities in each market. We are concerned with how the sustainability of collusion in one local market is affected … by the existence of collusion in other markets when they are linked by demand relationships. The interdependence of … collusion sustainability across markets leads to potential externalities in antitrust enforcement across jurisdictions. As a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051554
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Do buyer groups facilitate collusion?
Normann, Hans-Theo; Rösch, Jürgen; Schultz, Luis Manuel - Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), … - 2014
We explore whether lawful cooperation in buyer groups facilitates collusion in the product market. Buyer groups … constitute credible threats. Hence, in theory, buyer groups facilitate collusion. We run several experimental treatments using …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010983935
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Entry deterrence through cooperative R&D over-investment
Christin, Clémence - Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), … - 2011
In this paper, we highlight new conditions under which R&D agreements may have anti-competitive effects. We focus on cases where two firms compete with each other and with a competitive fringe. R&D activities need a specific input available to all firms on a common market, the price of which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009370794
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Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information
Vives, Xavier - CESifo - 2009
A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of the sellers have uncertain common and private value components and there is no exogenous noise in the system. A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008534061
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Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information
Vives, Xavier - CESifo - 2008
A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized in a market where firms have private information about their uncertain costs. It is found that with supply function competition, and in contrast to Bayesian Cournot competition, competitiveness is affected by the parameters of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094231
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Collusion in Beauty Contests
Wambach, Achim - CESifo - 2002
During the recent sales of UMTS licenses in Europe some countries used auctions while others resorted to so … argument why beauty contests or negotiations might be dominated by auctions, which is closely linked to the multi …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051542
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Auctions and Corruption
Lengwiler, Yvan; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - CESifo - 2000
In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we … bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181379