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characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583724
antitrust authorities in each market. We are concerned with how the sustainability of collusion in one local market is affected … by the existence of collusion in other markets when they are linked by demand relationships. The interdependence of … collusion sustainability across markets leads to potential externalities in antitrust enforcement across jurisdictions. As a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051554
A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of the sellers have uncertain common and private value components and there is no exogenous noise in the system. A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008534061
A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized in a market where firms have private information about their uncertain costs. It is found that with supply function competition, and in contrast to Bayesian Cournot competition, competitiveness is affected by the parameters of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094231
During the recent sales of UMTS licenses in Europe some countries used auctions while others resorted to so … argument why beauty contests or negotiations might be dominated by auctions, which is closely linked to the multi …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051542
In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we … bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181379
We study innovation contests with asymmetric information and identical contestants, where contestants’ efforts and innate abilities generate inventions of varying qualities. The designer offers a reward to the contestant achieving the highest quality and receives the revenue generated by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877748
We experimentally study auctions versus grandfathering in the initial assignment of pollution permits that can be …, the majority of permits are won by low emitters, reducing the need for spot-market trading. Auctions generate higher … consumer surplus and slightly lower product prices in the laboratory markets. Moreover, auctions eliminate the large “windfall …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005015169
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent’s type affects other agents’ utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150196
Public agencies rely on two key modes to procure goods and services: auctions and direct negotiations. The relative … passenger railway services in Germany, where regional agencies can use auctions and negotiations to procure regional passenger … auctions. This analysis suggests accounting for the endogeneity of the choice of procurement mode by estimating the mode of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009283196