In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we … bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes …

characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in …

antitrust authorities in each market. We are concerned with how the sustainability of collusion in one local market is affected … by the existence of collusion in other markets when they are linked by demand relationships. The interdependence of … collusion sustainability across markets leads to potential externalities in antitrust enforcement across jurisdictions. As a …

During the recent sales of UMTS licenses in Europe some countries used auctions while others resorted to so … argument why beauty contests or negotiations might be dominated by auctions, which is closely linked to the multi …

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we … bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes …

competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and …

game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient …, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double inefficiency. Moreover, we explain how optimal auctions differ from the …