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Core-stable Rings in Auctions with Independent Private Values
Biran, Omer; Forges, Francoise - CESifo - 2010
characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583724
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Managerial Effort Incentives and Market Collusion
Aubert, Cécile - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) - 2009
collusion to effort to increase profits. High profit targets — i.e., strong effort incentives — make participating in a cartel …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008465351
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International Antitrust Enforcement and Multi-Market Contact
Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko - CESifo - 2009
antitrust authorities in each market. We are concerned with how the sustainability of collusion in one local market is affected … by the existence of collusion in other markets when they are linked by demand relationships. The interdependence of … collusion sustainability across markets leads to potential externalities in antitrust enforcement across jurisdictions. As a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051554
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Prosecution and Leniency Programs: a Fool's Game
Sauvagnat, Julien - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) - 2010
We present a model where the Antitrust Authority is privately informed about the strength of the case against a given cartel. In this context, the Antitrust Authority may obtain cartel members' confessions even when it opens an investigation knowing that it has no chance to find hard evidence....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008643937
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Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information
Vives, Xavier - CESifo - 2009
A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of the sellers have uncertain common and private value components and there is no exogenous noise in the system. A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008534061
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Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information
Vives, Xavier - CESifo - 2008
A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized in a market where firms have private information about their uncertain costs. It is found that with supply function competition, and in contrast to Bayesian Cournot competition, competitiveness is affected by the parameters of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094231
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Collusion in Beauty Contests
Wambach, Achim - CESifo - 2002
During the recent sales of UMTS licenses in Europe some countries used auctions while others resorted to so … argument why beauty contests or negotiations might be dominated by auctions, which is closely linked to the multi …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051542
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Auctions and Corruption
Lengwiler, Yvan; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - CESifo - 2000
In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we … bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181379
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Innovation Contests
Pérez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David - CESifo - 2014
We study innovation contests with asymmetric information and identical contestants, where contestants’ efforts and innate abilities generate inventions of varying qualities. The designer offers a reward to the contestant achieving the highest quality and receives the revenue generated by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877748
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Implementation with Interdependent Valuations
McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2006
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent’s type affects other agents’ utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150196