characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in …

characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in …

antitrust authorities in each market. We are concerned with how the sustainability of collusion in one local market is affected … by the existence of collusion in other markets when they are linked by demand relationships. The interdependence of … collusion sustainability across markets leads to potential externalities in antitrust enforcement across jurisdictions. As a …

competition. The best collusion-proof contract entails distortions both for inefficient and efficient regulated firms (distortion … ‘at the top’). But a contract inducing active collusion may do better by allowing the regulator to ‘team up’ with the …

may collude. We show that, although regulation is partial, collusion-proofness can still be obtained, but is more costly …. When offering collusion-proof contracts, the regulator cannot benefit from the asymmetric information between firms …

During the recent sales of UMTS licenses in Europe some countries used auctions while others resorted to so … argument why beauty contests or negotiations might be dominated by auctions, which is closely linked to the multi …

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we … bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes …