This article analyzes tacit collusion in infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric …-quantity pair, perfect collusion with equal sharing of profit is easier to sustain in the uniform price auction than in the … set bids that are arbitrary finite step functions of price-quantity pairs, in repeated uniform price auctions maximal …

grand coalition is a known result. Finally, we study collusion in auctions as a mechanism design problem, insisting on the …

We examine a simple model of collusion under a single-object second-price auction. Under the appropriate parameter … conditions, in particular as long as collusion is neither too easy, nor too difficult, we find that the optimal policy involves …

characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in …

We study first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding where second movers may discover the … usual revenue dominance of first-price over second-price auctions. With a high probability of a leak, second-price auctions …

We use data on sequential water auctions to estimate demand when units are com- plements or substitutes. A sequential …

corresponding increased potential for product market collusion. We consider all trajectories that are candidates for an optimal … collusion could thus yield higher total surplus. …

antitrust authorities in each market. We are concerned with how the sustainability of collusion in one local market is affected … by the existence of collusion in other markets when they are linked by demand relationships. The interdependence of … collusion sustainability across markets leads to potential externalities in antitrust enforcement across jurisdictions. As a …

Collusion in auctions affects both revenue and efficiency and are prevalent. Yet, sellers do not use collusion … collusion-proof auctions. We use California highway procurements data, to estimate the cost of implementing collusion …-proof auctions as often as they should. Why is that? We find that one reason for this could be the cost of implementing efficient …