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Bounds on Revenue Distributions in Counterfactual Auctions with Reserve Prices
Tang, Xun - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2008
In first-price auctions with interdependent bidder values, the distributions of private signals and values cannot be … counterfactual first-price and second-price auctions with binding reserve prices. These robust bounds are identified from … distributions of equilibrium bids in first-price auctions under minimal restrictions where I allow for affiliated signals and both …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102122
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English Auctions with Ensuing Risks and Heterogeneous Bidders
Hu, Audrey; Matthews, Steven A.; Zou, Liang - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2015
We establish conditions under which an English auction for an indivisible risky asset has an efficient ex post equilibrium when the bidders are heterogeneous in both their exposures to, and their attitudes toward, the ensuing risk the asset will generate for the winning bidder. Each bidder's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011199195