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Does Central Bank Communication really Lead to better Forecasts of Policy Decisions? New Evidence Based on a Taylor Rule Model for the ECB

Sturm, Jan-Egbert; Haan, Jakob de - CESifo - 2009

central bank actions. We examine whether communication by the European Central Bank (ECB) adds information compared to the … ECB communication that are all based on the ECB President’s introductory statement at the press conference following an … included in our Taylor rule model, the ECB communication indicators remain significant. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005013956

The Role of Salience in Performance Schemes: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Englmaier, Florian; Roider, Andreas; Sunde, Uwe - CESifo - 2012

in quantity and quality of output. We use data from a controlled field experiment that changed the communication of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010539149

Read my Lips: the Role of Information Transmission in multilateral reform design

Marchesi, Silvia; Sabani, Laura; Dreher, Axel - Dipartimento di Economia, Management e Metodi … - 2009

We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (e.g., the IMF) and a country has for optimal (conditional) reform design. The main result is that the informational advantage of the country must be strictly greater than the advantage of the multilateral in order...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004982766

Agency and Communication in IMF Conditional Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Marchesi, Silvia; Sabani, Laura; Dreher, Axel - CESifo - 2009

We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051565

Long Persuasion Games

Forges, Francoise; Koessler, Frédéric - CESifo - 2006

This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181479

Does Money Matter in the ECB Strategy? New Evidence Based on ECB Communication

Berger, Helge; Sturm, Jan-Egbert - CESifo - 2006

We examine the role of money in the policies of the ECB, using introductory statements of the ECB President at the monthly press conferences during 1999-2004. Over time, the relative amount of words devoted to the monetary analysis has decreased. Our analysis of indicators of the monetary policy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406390

Information Transmission within Federal Fiscal Architectures: Theory and Evidence

Dreher, Axel; Gehring, Kai; Kotsogiannis, Christos; … - Dipartimento di Economia, Management e Metodi … - 2013

’ consists of unverifiable information and the quality of communication depends on the conflict of interests between the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010734630

Information Transmission and Ownership Consolidation in Aid Programs

Dreher, Axel; Marchesi, Silvia - Dipartimento di Economia, Management e Metodi … - 2013

This paper explores the role of information transmission in explaining donors\' choice between project aid and budget support. Budget support increases the involvement of recipient governments in the decision-making process and can thus be an example of a “delegation-scheme\". Conversely,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010734632

Does it Take Two to Tango? Improving Cooperation between the IMF and the World Bank: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Marchesi, Silvia; Sabani, Laura - Dipartimento di Economia, Management e Metodi … - 2013

This paper analyzes the impact of different governance structures on the degree of Bank-Fund cooperation, focusing on the quality of their information transmission. It compares the performance of a decentralized governance with that of a centralized one. A centralized structure better addresses...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010734635

Communicating Subjective Evaluations

Lang, Matthias - CESifo - 2014

Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? Suppose the principal’s evaluation is private information, but she can provide justification by sending a costly cheap-talk message. If she does not provide justification, her message space is restricted, but the message is costless. I...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781550