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International Environmental Agreements under Uncertainty: Does the Veil of Uncertainty Help?

Finus, Michael; Pintassilgo, Pedro - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

environmental agreements. Later papers confirmed this negative conclusion about the role of learning. In the light of intensified … a more general setting without restriction on the number of players and which considers not only no and full learning … but also partial learning. Second, we test whether the conclusion also holds if there is uncertainty about abatement costs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008465547

Tipping versus Cooperating to Supply a Public Good

Barrett, Scott; Dannenberg, Astrid - CESifo - 2015

In some important multi-player situations, such as efforts to supply a global public good, players can choose the game they want to play. In this paper we conduct an experimental test of the decision to choose between a “tipping” game, in which every player wants to contribute to the public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011210784

Modesty Pays: Sometimes!

Finus, Michael - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

Standard non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation: only small coalitions are stable that achieve only little. However, there also exist IEAs with higher participation and more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385341

New Roads to International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Global Warming

Finus, Michael; Eyckmans, Johan - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

We analyze with an integrated assessment model of climate change the formation of interna-tional environmental agreements (IEAs) by applying the widely used concept of inter-nal & external stability and several modifications of it. We relax the assumptions of a single agreement and open...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385422

A Non-cooperative Foundation of Core-Stability in Positive Externality NTU-Coalition Games

Finus, Michael; Rundshagen, Bianca - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

We identify the core as an appealing stability concept of cooperative game theory, but argue that the non-cooperative approach has conceptual advantages in the context of economic problems with externalities. Therefore, we derive a non-cooperative foundation of core-stability for positive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385485

How the Rules of Coalition Formation Affect Stability of International Environmental Agreements

Finus, Michael; Rundshagen, Bianca - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six different rules of coalition formation under very general conditions (any type of heterogeneity between countries). The rules can be interpreted as different institutional settings in which treaty formations take...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423070

Participation in International Environmental Agreements: The Role of Timing and Regulation

Finus, Michael; Rundshagen, Bianca - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

We analyze the formation of self-enforcing international environmental agreements under the assumption that countries announce their participation either simultaneously or sequentially. It is shown that a sequential formation process opens up possibilities for strategic behavior of countries...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423156

Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

Carraro, Carlo; Eyckmans, Johan; Finus, Michael - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005

The literature on international environmental agreements has recognized the role transfers play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs), but the few results achieved so far are overly specific and do not exploit the full potential of transfers for successful...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423229

Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game

Finus, Michael; Ierland, Ekko van - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

We empirically test stability of climate change coalitions with the STAbility of Coalitions model (STACO). The model comprises twelve world regions and captures important dynamic aspects of the climate change problem. We apply the stability concept of internal and external stability to a cartel...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423237

Negotiating to Avoid "Gradual" versus "Dangerous" Climate Change: An Experimental Test of Two Prisoners' Dilemma

Barrett, Scott; Dannenberg, Astrid - CESifo - 2014

According to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, global collective action is needed to stabilize “greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous [our emphasis] anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” The Framework Convention thus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010734324