When providing public goods through voluntary contributions, a donor may introduce unilateral matching in order to reduce underprovision of the public good and thus inefficiency. By itself, however, matching benefits the donor but harms the recipient. We apply Cornes and Hartley’s aggregative...

We study optimal climate policy for a “policy bloc” of countries facing a market where emissions offsets can be purchased from a non-policy “fringe” of countries (such as for the CDM). Policy-bloc firms benefit from free quota allocations whose quantity is updated according to firms’...

The green paradox conveys the idea that climate policies may have unintended side effects when taking into account the reaction of fossil fuel suppliers. In particular, carbon taxes that will be implemented in the future induce resource owners to extract more rapidly which increases present...

In absence of joint global climate action, several jurisdictions unilaterally restrict their domestic demand for fossil fuels. Another policy option for fossil fuel producing countries, not much explored, is to reduce own supply of fossil fuels. We explore analytically and numerically how...