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Is the Welfare State Sustainable? Experimental Evidence on Citizens' Preferences for Redistribution

Neustadt, Ilja; Zweifel, Peter - CESifo - 2010

elicited through a Discrete Choice Experiment performed in 2008 in Switzerland. Attributes are redistribution as GDP share, its …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511616

Measuring the Consumption Value of Higher Education

Alstadsæter, Annette - CESifo - 2009

This paper argues that the consumption value of education is an important motivation for the educational choice. While controlling for ability, we document that individuals are willing to forego substantial future wage returns in order to acquire a particular type of higher education. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008533984

The Consumption Value of Higher Education

Alstadsæter, Annette; Sievertsen, Hans Henrik - CESifo - 2009

The consumption value of higher education is an important factor behind the individual’s educational choice. We provide a comprehensive literature survey, and define the consumption value as the private, intended, non-pecuniary return to higher education. We provide new empirical evidence for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008534058

Public-Good Valuation and Intrafamily Allocation

Strand, Jon - CESifo - 2004

I derive values of marginal changes in a public good for two-person households, measured alternatively by household member i’s willingness to pay (WTP) for the good on behalf of the household, WTPi(H), or by the sum of individual WTP values across family members, WTP(C). Households are assumed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181474

The Dead-anyway Effect Revis(it)ed

Breyer, Friedrich; Felder, Stefan - CESifo - 2002

In the expected-utility theory of the monetary value of a statistical life, the so-called “dead-anyway” effect discovered by Pratt and Zeckhauser (1996) asserts that an individuals' willingness to pay (WTP) for small reductions in mortality risk increases with the initial level of risk....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405707

(Un)Reliable Concessions in Static andDynamic Bargaining Experiments

Fischer, Sven; González Morales, Luis G.; Güth, Werner - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

A two-persons bargaining problem often consists of initially incompatible demands that can be unilaterally reduced by sequential concessions. In a 2 x 2 x 2-factorial design we distinguish between reliable and unreliable concessions, between a static and dynamic settings and between symmetric...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866602

Measuring the Degree of Ambiguity about Probability: Experimental Evidence

Morone, Andrea; Özdemir, Özlem - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

This paper aims to experimentally investigate how individual willingness to pay for a lottery is affected by using a new way of representing of probabilistic ambiguity. Thus we can see how individual valuation reacts to different degrees of ambiguity probability information provided to subjects....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866670

Collaborative Networks in Experimental Triopolies

Pantz, Katinka; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

. We report the results of a series ofexperiments. The first experiment is designed as a straightforward theory … symmetric networks. Collusion cannot account for the observed behavior. In our second experiment we reject the conjecture that … two-stage game. Finally, in our third experiment we reduce the complexity of the setting by transforming the original two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866674

The Regulation of Nonpoint Emissions in the Laboratory:A Stress Test of the Ambient Tax Mechanism

Boun My, Kene; Cochard, François; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

We investigate the ability of the damage based tax mechanism to induce socially optimal outcomes in a controlled laboratory environment which incorporates important aspects of nonpoint pollution problems. Our experimental setting combines a strictly convex damage function with uncertainty in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866677

Inequality Aversion in Ultimatum Gameswith Asymmetric Conflict Payoffs

Fischer, Sven - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

Assuming inequality averse subjects as modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or in the ERC model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) in ultimatum games with asymmetric conflict payoffs allows to make predictions especially concerning responder acceptance thresholds. These predictions are tested in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866680