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We introduce tax competition for mobile labor into an optimal-taxation model with two skill levels. We analyze a symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game between two governments and two taxpayer populations. Tax competition reduces the distortion from the informational asymmetry...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008533992
capital), and the volume of migration (of both skill types), to be higher in the competitive regime than in the coordinated … positive if the (state variable) the capital stock is within a certain range, or zero, otherwise. Migration share of native … level, otherwise. In the case of private saving only regime, the migration share is intermediate level. Thus, migration …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010652442
indicate that income taxes are a significant pull factor for international migration decisions. The same is true with respect … to intra-national migration. However, dominance analysis suggests that the relative impact of taxes compared to other …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877741
If countries anticipate Bertrand competition in tax rates, they may expend effort that makes some of their tax payers less mobile or increases the mobility of tax payers elsewhere. I provide piecemeal evidence on what activities countries use. I analyse how such activities interact with Bertrand...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406068
widening as migration costs decrease. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010550243
This paper tests the existence of strategic interactions among municipalities using a panel of Belgian local tax rates from 1985 to 2004. A special emphasis is put on the role of the language spoken in the various municipalities. Our results first confirm previous findings for Belgium suggesting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406425