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What Explains the Rise in CEO Pay in Germany? A Panel Data Analysis for 1977-2009

Fabbri, Francesca; Marin, Dalia - CESifo - 2012

The compensation of executive board members in Germany has become a highly controversial topic since Vodafone’s hostile takeover of Mannesmann in 2000 and it is again in the spotlight since the outbreak of the financial crisis of 2009. Based on unique panel data evidence of the 500 largest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009653374

Managerial Hedging and Portfolio Monitoring

Bisin, Alberto; Gottardi, Piero; Rampini, Adriano A. - CESifo - 2004

firms. We study the agency problem between shareholders and a manager when the manager can hedge his incentive compensation … using financial markets and shareholders cannot perfectly monitor the manager’s portfolio in order to keep him from hedging … the risk in his compensation. In particular, shareholders can monitor the manager’s portfolio stochastically, and since …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094243

Learning from the Past: Trends in Executive Compensation over the Twentieth Century

Frydman, Carola - CESifo - 2008

In recent years, a large academic debate has tried to explain the rapid rise in CEO pay experienced over the past three decades. In this article, I review the main proposed theories, which span views of compensation as the result of a competitive labor market for executivesto theories based on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405726

CEO Compensation

Frydman, Carola; Jenter, Dirk - CESifo - 2010

This paper surveys the recent literature on CEO compensation. The rapid rise in CEO pay over the past 30 years has sparked an intense debate about the nature of the pay-setting process. Many view the high level of CEO compensation as the result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008799732