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Optimal Delegation when the Large Shareholder has Multiple Tasks
Graziano, Clara; Luporini, Annalisa - CESifo - 2010
We analyze the optimal ownership, delegation and compensation structures when a manager is hired to run a firm and to gather information on investment projects. The initial owner has two tasks: monitoring the manager and supervising project choice. Optimality would require a large ownership...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596583
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Ownership Concentration, Monitoring and Optimal Board Structure
Graziano, Clara; Luporini, Annalisa - CESifo - 2005
on new investment projects without reducing the large shareholder’s incentive to monitor the manager. This results in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765820
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Managerial Hedging and Portfolio Monitoring
Bisin, Alberto; Gottardi, Piero; Rampini, Adriano A. - CESifo - 2004
firms. We study the agency problem between shareholders and a manager when the manager can hedge his incentive compensation … using financial markets and shareholders cannot perfectly monitor the manager’s portfolio in order to keep him from hedging … the risk in his compensation. In particular, shareholders can monitor the manager’s portfolio stochastically, and since …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094243