I study climate policy choices for a “policy bloc” of fuel-importers, when a “fringe” of other fuel importers have no climate policy, fuel exporters consume no fossil fuels, and importers produce no such fuels. The policy bloc and exporter blocs act strategically in fossil fuel markets....

We present a unified treatment of optimal trade policy for a small country. The well-known results for duopoly and competitive markets emerge as benchmark cases of our model. In addition, we show that changes in market structure have non-monotonic effects on optimal tariffs. Our results suggest...

We study the profitability incentives of merger and the endogenous industry structure in a strategic trade policy environment. Merger changes the strategic trade policy equlilibrium. We show that merger can be profitable and welfare enhancing here, even though it would not be profitable in a...

This paper studies non-cooperative commodity taxation in a trade model with imperfect competition and trade costs. Nationally optimal tax policy simultaneously tries to correct the domestic distortion from imperfect competition and to shift rents to the home country. Importantly, this trade-off...

We study a policy game between exporting and importing countries in vertically linked industries. In a successive international Cournot oligopoly, we analyse incentives for using tax instruments strategically to shift rents vertically, between exporting and importing countries, and horizontally,...

This paper investigates the domestic government’s antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework where the foreign firm’s cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. To induce truthful revelation, the government can design a tariff schedule, contingent...