private firm. We solve analytically for the Kantian equilibrium of this lobbying game together with the majority voting … more concentrated among the top productivity individuals, their increased lobbying effort generates efficiency as well as …

In this paper we model the commercial lobbying industry (such as the so-called K-Street lobbyists of Washington, D ….C.). In contrast to classical special interest groups commercial lobbying firms are not directly motivated by policy outcomes … level of commercial lobbying services is typically socially inefficient, and characterize the nature of the distortions …

democracy where citizens can lobby an elected policy-maker. We find that lobbying always matters. That is, lobbying always …

We study lobbying behavior by firms in a two-region economy, with either centralized or decentralized provision of … profit-enhancing local public goods. Firms compete either in the market, lobbying for public good provision once entered in a … market, or for the market, lobbying to gain ccess to it. When firms compete in the market, we show that lobbying is …

lobbying, because now decisions are too sensitive to the preferences of the organised group. …

clarify how stake asymmetry, lobbying-skill asymmetry and return to lobbying effort determine the relative desirability, from …