work for. We reject, however, the efficient pay hypothesis as CEO pay and the demand for managers increases in Germany in … difficult times when the typical firm size shrinks. We find further that domestic and global competition for managers has …

findings suggest that, when managers engage in wasteful capital expenditures, welfare may decline if the cost of investment is …

By studying the gap between the discount rates used by executives and shareholders, we assess the extent to which …

can limit the interference of the large shareholder and can restore manager’s incentive to exert effort to become informed … on new investment projects without reducing the large shareholder’s incentive to monitor the manager. This results in …

using financial markets and shareholders cannot perfectly monitor the manager’s portfolio in order to keep him from hedging … the risk in his compensation. In particular, shareholders can monitor the manager’s portfolio stochastically, and since …Incentive compensation induces correlation between the portfolio of managers and the cash flow of the firms they manage …

-controlling shareholders are different because the former are able to divert a fraction of the profits. We find that when investor protection … by the non-controlling shareholders. The empirical analysis supports the predictions of the model. In particular …