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What is the Relation (if any) Between a Firm's Corporate Governance Arrangements and its Financial Performance?

Wessels, Roberto E.; Wansbeek, Tom J.; Dam, Lammertjan - CESifo - 2014

We present a model to test the null hypothesis that firms organize their corporate governancearrangements optimally given the constraints they face. Following the literature, the modelrejects the null if the conditional correlation between governance and performance issignificantly different...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249564

What Explains the Rise in CEO Pay in Germany? A Panel Data Analysis for 1977-2009

Fabbri, Francesca; Marin, Dalia - CESifo - 2012

The compensation of executive board members in Germany has become a highly controversial topic since Vodafone’s hostile takeover of Mannesmann in 2000 and it is again in the spotlight since the outbreak of the financial crisis of 2009. Based on unique panel data evidence of the 500 largest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009653374

Optimal Delegation when the Large Shareholder has Multiple Tasks

Graziano, Clara; Luporini, Annalisa - CESifo - 2010

We analyze the optimal ownership, delegation and compensation structures when a manager is hired to run a firm and to gather information on investment projects. The initial owner has two tasks: monitoring the manager and supervising project choice. Optimality would require a large ownership...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596583

Corporate Deductibility Provisions and Managerial Incentives

Köthenbürger, Marko; Stimmelmayr, Michael - CESifo - 2013

Using an agency model of firm behavior, the paper analyzes whether the cost of investment should be tax exempt. The findings suggest that, when managers engage in wasteful capital expenditures, welfare may decline if the cost of investment is tax deductible, as commonly advocated. The extent to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010732350

A Theory of Tax Avoidance - Managerial Incentives for Tax Planning in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model

Ewert, Ralf; Niemann, Rainer - CESifo - 2014

We derive determinants of tax avoidance by means of a multi-task principal-agent model. We extend prevailing models by integrating both corporate and individual income taxation as well as by including tax planning effort in the agent’s action portfolio. Our model shows novel and apparently...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010786744

The Effect of Corporate Taxation and Ownership on Raising Shareholder Capital

Krämer, Robert; Lipatov, Vilen - CESifo - 2013

model with strategic interaction between managers and outside shareholders, we hypothesize that, while an increase in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010701082

A Revealed Preference Approach to Understanding Corporate Governance Problems: Evidence from Canada

Chirinko, Robert S.; Schaller, Huntley - CESifo - 2002

By studying the gap between the discount rates used by executives and shareholders, we assess the extent to which …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765749

Ownership Concentration, Monitoring and Optimal Board Structure

Graziano, Clara; Luporini, Annalisa - CESifo - 2005

on new investment projects without reducing the large shareholder’s incentive to monitor the manager. This results in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765820

The Positive Economics of Labor Market Rigidities and Investor Protection

Fehn, Rainer; Meier, Carsten-Patrick - CESifo - 2001

This paper presents a positive model which shows that institutional setups on capital and labor markets might be intertwined by politicoeconomic forces. Some countries especially in continental Europe exhibit a corporatist politicoeconomic equilibrium with a substantial protection of insiders on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766256

Managerial Hedging and Portfolio Monitoring

Bisin, Alberto; Gottardi, Piero; Rampini, Adriano A. - CESifo - 2004

firms. We study the agency problem between shareholders and a manager when the manager can hedge his incentive compensation … using financial markets and shareholders cannot perfectly monitor the manager’s portfolio in order to keep him from hedging … the risk in his compensation. In particular, shareholders can monitor the manager’s portfolio stochastically, and since …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094243