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If the threshold that triggers climate catastrophe is known with certainty, and the benefits of avoiding catastrophe are high relative to the costs, treaties can easily coordinate countries’ behavior so as to avoid the threshold. Where the net benefits of avoiding catastrophe are lower,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877724
unique equilibrium where legal enforcement remains weak and individual values discourage cooperation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005249467
Economic and social interaction takes place between individuals with heterogeneous characteristics. We investigate experimentally the emergence and informal enforcement of different contribution norms to a public good in homogeneous and different heterogeneous groups. When punishment is not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005013056
We develop a model that relates self-control and conflict identification to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas. As … of cooperation. This means that there is evidence for an impulse to be selfish and that cooperative behavior requires …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010639421
games. Among them are the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, a reduced best-shot game, the dictator game, the prisoner …’s dilemma, and public goods games. Furthermore, the theory explains why the same consequences trigger different reciprocal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765909
Trust games are employed to investigate the effect of heterogeneity in income and race on cooperation in South Africa …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766054
In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start off high and decline as the game is repeated. If high …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004979399
In public good provision, privileged groups enjoy the advantage that some of its members find it optimal to supply a positive amount of the public good. However, their inherent asymmetric nature may make the enforcement of cooperative behavior through informal sanctioning harder to accomplish....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094348
venture, the firms do not necessary choose the highest degree of cooperation available. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094393
We construct an asymmetri c duopolistic R&D and production behavior model subject to knowledge spillovers. This model is an extension to the symmetric model of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (A&J (1988)) and aims to determine the cooperative and non-cooperative R&D strategies for two agents of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094507