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Dreher, Axel; Sturm, Jan-Egbert; Vreeland, James Raymond - CESifo - 2013

Bailouts sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are famous for their conditionality: in return for continued installments of desperately needed loans, governments must comply with austere policy changes. Many have suggested, however, that politically important countries face rather...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877803

Do IMF and World Bank Influence Voting in the UN General Assembly?

Dreher, Axel; Sturm, Jan-Egbert - CESifo - 2006

Using panel data for 188 countries over the period 1970-2002 this paper empirically analyzes the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. Countries receiving adjustment programs and larger non-concessional loans from the World Bank vote more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181533

Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence IMF Decisions? Evidence from Panel Data

Dreher, Axel; Sturm, Jan-Egbert; Vreeland, James Raymond - CESifo - 2006

We investigate whether temporary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the IMF, using panel data for 191 countries over the period 1951 to 2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary UN Security Council membership and participation in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005416462

Of Donor Coordination, Free-Riding, Darlings, and Orphans: The Dependence of Bilateral Aid on Other Bilateral Giving

Davies, Ronald B.; Klasen, Stephan - CESifo - 2013

Using data from 1988 to 2007, we examine to what extent bilateral aid flows of an individual donor to a country depend … on aid flows from all other bilateral and multilateral donors to that country. We thereby want to assess to what extent … donor coordination, free-riding, selectivity, specialization, and common donor motivations drive bilateral aid allocation as …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010634080

Immunity

Reddy, Karthik; Schularick, Moritz; Skreta, Vasiliki - CESifo - 2013

Legal provisions that protect politicians from arrest and prosecution exist throughout much of the modern democratic world. Why, and with what effects, do societies choose to place their politicians above the law? We examine the institution of immunity both theoretically and empirically. Our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877744

Identification of Voters with Interest Groups Improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger

Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; Winden, Frans Van - CESifo - 2010

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior, these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596579

Why does Environmental Policy in Representative Democracies Tend to be Inadequate? A Preliminary Public Choice Analysis

Kollmann, Andrea; Schneider, Friedrich - CESifo - 2010

There is a widespread consensus among the most important players in developed countries (voters, politicians, producers, traditional and green interest groups and bureaucracies) that a shift towards an eco-social market economy is essential for sustainable growth. Nevertheless, market-based...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727290

On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups

Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; Winden, Frans van - CESifo - 2006

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765946

On the Political Economy of Environmental Policy

Kirchgässner, Gebhard; Schneider, Friedrich - CESifo - 2002

In the past there was hardly any use of economic instruments in environmental policy, mainly command and control measures were used. More recently, ecological taxes as well as tradable permits became more popular and voluntary agreements have been imple-mented. Using the Public Choice ap-proach...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051508

Strategic Restraint in Contests

Epstein, Gil S.; Nitzan, Shmuel - CESifo - 2000

Economic policy is modeled as the outcome of a (political) game between two inte rest groups. The possible ex-post (realized) outcomes in the game correspond to the proposed policies. In the literature the policies fought for are exogenous. We extend such games by allowing the endogenous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181372