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Institution Formation in Public Goods Games

Kosfeld, Michael; Okada, Akira; Riedl, Arno - CESifo - 2006

Centralized sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-riding tendencies and enforcing outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations. However, little is known about how such institutions come into existence. In this paper we investigate, both...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406364

Optimal Unemployment Insurance Design: Time Limits, Monitoring, or Workfare?

Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - CESifo - 2003

of improving the efficiency of UI: the duration of benefit payments, monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and … monitoring and sanctions restores search incentives most effectively, since it brings additional incentives to search actively so … monitoring and sanctions than in the other two systems. Workfare appears to be inferior to the other two systems. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406375

Political Institutions and Government Spending Behavior in Iran

Dizaji, Sajjad Faraji; Farzanegan, Mohammad Reza - CESifo - 2014

especially important due to recent international sanctions, aiming to change the political behavior of Iran. We use the impulse … education expenditures in short term. If sanctions are successful to change the political behavior of Iran in short run (Dizaji …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010739347

Monitoring, Sanctions and Front-Loading of Job Search in a Non-Stationary Model

Cockx, Bart; Dejemeppe, Muriel; Launov, Andrey; Linden, … - CESifo - 2011

sanctions insured unemployed whose effort is deemed insufficient. The model reveals that such schemes provide incentives to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009371346

Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research

Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - CESifo - 2003

sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. Our reading of the theoretical literature is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094257

Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions

Boone, Jan; Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil; Ours, … - CESifo - 2001

effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient. We find that introducing monitoring and sanctions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094450

Suicide Attacks and Religious Cleavages

Filote, Andra; Potrafke, Niklas; Ursprung, Heinrich - CESifo - 2015

Many experts claim that the incidence of suicide attacks is driven by religious cleavages. To test this hypothesis, we investigate whether the total number of suicide attacks per violent conflict or the annual number of suicide attacks per country is associated with simmering religious...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011155382

Negotiating to Avoid "Gradual" versus "Dangerous" Climate Change: An Experimental Test of Two Prisoners' Dilemma

Barrett, Scott; Dannenberg, Astrid - CESifo - 2014

According to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, global collective action is needed to stabilize “greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous [our emphasis] anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” The Framework Convention thus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010734324

Trade Policy Uncertainty and Exports: Evidence from China's WTO Accession

Feng, Ling; Li, Zhiyuan; Swenson, Deborah L. - CESifo - 2014

To understand the effects of trade policy uncertainty on firm-level export decisions, we study firm-product data on Chinese exports to the U.S. in the years surrounding China’s 2001 WTO accession. Following predictions based on a model of heterogeneous firms, we provide empirical evidence that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010765496

Hanging Together or Being Hung Separately: The Strategic Power of Coalitions where Bargaining Occurs with Incomplete Information

Konrad, Kai A.; Cusack, Thomas R. - CESifo - 2013

What is the strategic role of membership in an intergovernmental group with unanimity requirements if the group negotiates with an external player in a setting with incomplete information? Being in such a group has a strategic effect compared to negotiating as a stand-alone player and reduces...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877880