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Expectations as Reference Points: Field Evidence from Experienced Subjects in a Competitive, High-Stakes Environment

Bartling, Björn; Brandes, Leif; Schunk, Daniel - CESifo - 2012

We show that professional soccer players exhibit reference-dependent behavior during matches. Controlling for the state of the match and for unobserved heterogeneity, we show on a minute-by-minute basis that a player breaches the rules of the game, measured by the referee’s assignment of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010551016

Reference Points and Effort Provision

Abeler, Johannes; Falk, Armin; Götte, Lorenz; Huffman, … - CESifo - 2009

candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment …, we manipulate the rational expectations of subjects and check whether this manipulation influences their effort provision …-based reference-dependent preferences: if expectations are high, subjects work longer and earn more money than if expectations are low. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051581

The Long-Run Evolution of Infrastructure Services

Goldsmith, Hugh - CESifo - 2014

This paper traces the 11,000 year evolution of infrastructure systems during major periods of innovation, expansion and diffusion. Throughout history, the key role of the State is self-evident. Private sector involvement has waxed and waned over millennia, although at times it has been pivotal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011082831

The Fatter the Tail, the Fatter the Climate Agreement - Simulating the Influence of Fat Tails in Climate Change Damages on the Success of International Climate Negotiations

Dekker, Thijs; Dellink, Rob; Ketterer, Janina - CESifo - 2013

International climate negotiations take place in a setting where uncertainties regarding the impacts of climate change are very large. In this paper, we examine the influence of increasing the probability and impact of large climate change damages, also known as the ‘fat tail’, on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010948839

A Market for Connections

Miettinen, Topi; Poutvaara, Panu - CESifo - 2012

Government or company decisions on whom to hire are mostly delegated to politicians, public sector officials or human resources and procurement managers. Due to anti-corruption laws, agents cannot sell contracts or positions that they are delegated to decide upon. Even if bribing is ruled out,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010548151

Information, Uncertainty, and Subjective Entitlements in Bargaining

Karagözoglu, Emin; Riedl, Arno - CESifo - 2010

More often than not production processes are the joint endeavor of people having different abilities and productivities. Such production processes and the associated surplus production are often not fully transparent in the sense that the relative contributions of involved agents are blurred;...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511615

Information, Coordination, and the Industrialization of Countries

Englmaier, Florian; Reisinger, Markus - CESifo - 2006

The industrialization process of a country is often plagued by a failure to coordinate investment decisions. Using the Global Games approach we can solve this coordination problem and eliminate the problem of multiple equilibria. We show how appropriate information provision enhances efficiency....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094193

Statute Law or Case Law?

Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo; Riboni, Alessandro - CESifo - 2008

In a Case Law regime Courts have more flexibility than in a Statute Law regime. Since Statutes are inevitably incomplete, this confers an advantage to the Statute Law regime over the Case Law one. However, all Courts rule ex-post, after most economic decisions are already taken. Therefore, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181237

Evolutionarily Stable Preferences in Contests

Leininger, Wolfgang - CESifo - 2008

We define an indirect evolutionary approach formally and apply it to (Tullock) contests. While it is known (Leininger, 2003) that the direct evolutionary approach in the form of finite population ESS (Schaffer, 1988) yields more aggressive behavior than in Nash equilibrium, it is now shown that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406304

Compliance Dynamics Generated by Social Interaction Rules

Lipatov, Vilen - CESifo - 2014

We study compliance dynamics generated by a large set of behavioral rules describing social interaction in a population of agents facing an enforcement authority. When the authority adjusts the auditing probability every period, cycling in cheating-auditing occurs: Intensive monitoring induces...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010764298