Similar Search Results

Implementing Partial Tax Harmonization in an Asymmetric Tax Competition Game with Repeated Interaction

Itaya, Jun-ichi; Okamura, Makoto; Yamaguchi, Chikara - CESifo - 2015

This paper investigates the conditions under which partial harmonization for capital taxation is sustained in a repeated interactions model of tax competition when there are three countries with heterogenous capital endowments. We show that regardless of the structure of the coalition (i.e. full...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011265256

Partial Harmonization of Corporate Taxes in an Asymmetric Repeated Game Setting

Itaya, Jun-ichi; Okamura, Makoto; Yamaguchi, Chikara - CESifo - 2010

This paper investigates the conditions under which partial harmonization for capital taxation is sustained in a repeated interactions model of tax competition when there are three heterogenous countries with respect to their capital endowments. We show that regardless of the structure of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727308

Tax Competition, the Distribution of MNE's Ownership and the Wage Formation Process

Gérard, Marcel - CESifo - 2002

This paper shows how the distribution of the ownership of multinational companies and the labour market conditions, especially the wage formation process, influence the outcome of interjurisdictional tax competition and coordination. In particular, it sets forth that equilibrium corporate tax...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094271

International Tax Coordination: Regionalism Versus Globalism

Sørensen, Peter Birch - CESifo - 2001

Tax competition for mobile capital can undermine the attempts of governments to redistribute income from rich to poor. I study whether international tax coordination can alleviate this problem, using a general equilibrium model synthesizing recent contributions to the tax competition literature....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406302

Self-Enforcing Capital Tax Coordination

Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Rüdiger - CESifo - 2013

Capital tax competition is known to result in inefficiently low tax rates and an undersupply of public goods. The provision of public goods and with it the welfare of all countries can be enhanced via tax coordination. Based on the standard Zodrow-Mieszkowski-Wilson tax-competition model this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706007

Partial Tax Coordination in a Repeated Game Setting

Itaya, Jun-ichi; Okamura, Makoto; Yamaguchi, Chikara - CESifo - 2010

This paper addresses the problem of partial tax coordination among regional or national sovereign governments in a repeated game setting. We show that partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the number of regions in a coalition subgroup is smaller and the number of existing regions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511608

Inefficient Lock-in and Subsidy Competition

Borck, Rainald; Koh, Hyun-Ju; Pflüger, Michael - CESifo - 2009

This paper shows that subsidy competition may be efficiency enhancing. We model a subsidy game among two asymmetric regions in a new trade model, where capital can freely move among regions, but capital rewards are repatriated. We study subsidy competition, starting from an equilibrium where the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051556

Coordinating VATs Between EU Member States

Genser, Bernd - CESifo - 2002

The paper surveys the characteristics of the common European VAT system, proposed by the EU-Commission to overcome the weaknesses of the transitional European VAT system, which was enacted in 1993 and is still in force. We argue that a harmonized VAT rate will generate substantial costs for EU...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181303

Enhanced Cooperation in an Asymmetric Model of Tax Competition

Vrijburg, Hendrik; Mooij, Ruud A. De - CESifo - 2010

This paper analyzes enhanced cooperation agreements in corporate taxation in a three country tax competition model … an enhanced cooperation agreement. Conditions for strategic complementarity or strategic substitutability of tax rates … are crucial for the welfare effects of enhanced cooperation. Simulations show that enhanced cooperation is unlikely to be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583708

Stable and Sustainable Global Tax Coordination with Leviathan Governments

Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Rüdiger - CESifo - 2014

Itaya et al. (2014) study the conditions for sustainability and stability of capital tax coordination in a repeated game model with tax-revenue maximizing governments. One of their major results is that the grand tax coalition is never stable and sustainable. The purpose of this note is to prove...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877774

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last