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Teams Punish Less
Auerswald, Heike; Schmidt, Carsten; Thum, Marcel; … - CESifo - 2013
punishment option and compare it to the behavior of individuals in a laboratory experiment. We also consider different team …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010697224
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Strong, Bold, and Kind: Self-Control and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
Kocher, Martin G.; Martinsson, Peter; Myrseth, Kristian … - CESifo - 2013
predicted, we find in a laboratory public goods experiment a robust association between stronger self-control and higher levels …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010639421
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Social Ties in a Public Good Experiment
Dijk, Frans van; Sonnemans, Joep; Winden, Frans van - CESifo - 2000
The formation of social ties is examined in an experimental study of voluntary public good provision. The experimental design consists of three parts. In the first part the value orientation (attitude to a generalized other) is measured. In the second part couples play a multi-period public good...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766220
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Tipping versus Cooperating to Supply a Public Good
Barrett, Scott; Dannenberg, Astrid - CESifo - 2015
In some important multi-player situations, such as efforts to supply a global public good, players can choose the game they want to play. In this paper we conduct an experimental test of the decision to choose between a “tipping” game, in which every player wants to contribute to the public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011210784
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Intentions Undercover - Hiding Intentions is Considered Unfair
Friehe, Tim; Utikal, Verena - CESifo - 2015
Unfair intentions provoke negative reciprocity from others, making their concealment potentially beneficial. This paper …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011185621
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Does Instrumental Reciprocity Crowd out Prosocial Behavior?
Johnsen, Åshild A.; Kvaløy, Ola - CESifo - 2014
experimentally investigate the relationship between intrinsic and instrumental reciprocity by running a two-period repeated trust … do not know and hence the second period comes as a surprise. We find that subjects anticipate instrumental reciprocity …, and that intrinsic reciprocity is rewarded. In fact, the total level of cooperation, in which trust is reciprocated, is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011082823
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Reciprocity and Emotions when Reciprocators Know each other
Reuben, Ernesto; Winden, Frans van - CESifo - 2006
This is an experimental study of a three-player power-to-take game where a take authority is matched with two responders. The game consists of two stages. In the first stage, the take authority decides how much of the endowment of each responder that is left after the second stage will be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181255
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Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations
Forges, Francoise; Salomon, Antoine - CESifo - 2014
Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010752435
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Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good Games with Heterogeneous Populations
Reuben, Ernesto; Riedl, Arno - CESifo - 2009
tacitly agree on the norm to be enforced, even if this leads to large payoff differences. Our results also emphasize the role …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005013056
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Political Economists are Neither Selfish Nor Indoctrinated
Frey, Bruno S.; Meier, Stephan - CESifo - 2001
that economics education does not make people act more selfishly. Rather, this natural experiment suggests that the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405815