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Altruism and Envy in Contests: An Evolutionarily Stable Symbiosis

Konrad, Kai A. - CESifo - 2002

Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is evolutionarily stable.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766134

Tax Competition, Relative Performance and Policy Imitation

Wagener, Andreas - CESifo - 2009

boundedly rational governments, thus, involves drastic efficiency losses. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005013050

Contests over Public Goods: Evolutionary Stability and the Free-Rider Problem

Leininger, Wolfgang - CESifo - 2002

We analyze group contests for public goods by applying the solution concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). We show that a global ESS cannot exist, because a mutant free-rider can always invade group behavior successfully. There does exist, however, a unique local ESS, which we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051494

Evolutionarily Stable Preferences in Contests

Leininger, Wolfgang - CESifo - 2008

We define an indirect evolutionary approach formally and apply it to (Tullock) contests. While it is known (Leininger, 2003) that the direct evolutionary approach in the form of finite population ESS (Schaffer, 1988) yields more aggressive behavior than in Nash equilibrium, it is now shown that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406304

Finite-Population "Mass-Action" and Evolutionary Stability

Bernergard, Axel; Wärneryd, Karl - CESifo - 2011

Nash proposed an interpretation of mixed strategies as the average pure-strategy play of a population of players randomly matched to play a normal-form game. If populations are finite, some equilibria of the underlying game have no such corresponding “mass-action” equilibrium. We show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008872223

Bargaining and Distribution of Power in the EU's Conciliation Committee

Napel, Stefan; Widgrén, Mika - CESifo - 2003

makers’, understanding of the final stage of the procedure – bargaining in the Conciliation Committee – is crucial. Here, EP … bargaining theory to predict inter-institutional agreements in the Conciliation Committee, it turns out that although …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765847

Wages, Unemployment, and the Underground Economy

Kolm, Ann-Sofie; Larsen, Birthe - CESifo - 2003

two-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker-firm wage bargaining. Workers search for jobs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766198

Reciprocity and Emotions: Arousal, Self-Reports, and Expectations

Ben-Shakhar, Gershon; Bornstein, Gary; Hopfensitz, Astrid; … - CESifo - 2004

Although reciprocity is a key concept in the social sciences, it is still unclear why people engage in costly reciprocation. In this study, physiological and self-report measures were employed to investigate the role of emotions, using the Power-to-Take Game. In this 2-person game, player 1 can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766252

Reforming Legislatures: Is one House better than two?

Facchini, Giovanni; Testa, Cecilia - CESifo - 2009

constitutional reforms. In a setting where lawmakers interact with a lobby through a bargaining process and with voters by means of … elections, we show that when time constraints are binding, bicameralism might lead to a decline in the legislator's bargaining …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004979403

A Stochastic Multiple Players Multi-Issues Bargaining Model for the Piave River Basin

Sgobbi, Alessandra; Carraro, Carlo - CESifo - 2007

The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of … multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model of water allocation in the Piave River Basin, in the North East of … problem and conduct comparative static analyses to assess sources of bargaining power. Finally, we explore the implications of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005249457