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We define an indirect evolutionary approach formally and apply it to (Tullock) contests. While it is known (Leininger, 2003) that the direct evolutionary approach in the form of finite population ESS (Schaffer, 1988) yields more aggressive behavior than in Nash equilibrium, it is now shown that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406304
boundedly rational governments, thus, involves drastic efficiency losses. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005013050
Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is evolutionarily stable.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766134
We analyze group contests for public goods by applying the solution concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). We show that a global ESS cannot exist, because a mutant free-rider can always invade group behavior successfully. There does exist, however, a unique local ESS, which we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051494
Nash proposed an interpretation of mixed strategies as the average pure-strategy play of a population of players randomly matched to play a normal-form game. If populations are finite, some equilibria of the underlying game have no such corresponding “mass-action” equilibrium. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008872223
constitutional reforms. In a setting where lawmakers interact with a lobby through a bargaining process and with voters by means of … elections, we show that when time constraints are binding, bicameralism might lead to a decline in the legislator's bargaining …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004979403
We experimentally investigate a bargaining environment in which players negotiate over a fixed payment to one player …. Moreover, bargaining frictions increase as risk increases, and we document more frequent disagreements as risk increases. When … bargaining models require some separation between the determinants of bargaining power and fair compensation for risk exposure. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011086455
show that a profit tax and a transaction tax have opposite implications for equilibrium outcome in bargaining. A marginal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011120474
additional bargaining power. Negotiating as a group may also cause more inefficiencies due to bargaining failure, and this may …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877880
In a recent paper Konrad and Thum (2014) present a model that shows that unilateral pre-commitment reduces the likelihood of agreement in bilateral negotiations over the provision of a public good when parties have private information over their contribution costs. We test the model in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877951