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Voting on Punishment Systems within a Heterogeneous Group
Noussair, Charles; Tan, Fangfang - CESifo - 2009
productivity. Nevertheless, only a minority of sessions converge to this system, indicating a tendency for the voting process to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005013941
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Tipping versus Cooperating to Supply a Public Good
Barrett, Scott; Dannenberg, Astrid - CESifo - 2015
In some important multi-player situations, such as efforts to supply a global public good, players can choose the game they want to play. In this paper we conduct an experimental test of the decision to choose between a “tipping” game, in which every player wants to contribute to the public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011210784
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Voting on Thresholds for Public Goods: Experimental Evidence
Rauchdobler, Julian; Sausgruber, Rupert; Tyran, Jean-Robert - CESifo - 2009
, because voting may facilitate coordination due to signaling and commitment effects. We find that voting does have signaling …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583651
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Group Contests with Complementarities in Efforts
Kolmar, Martin; Rommeswinkel, Hendrik - CESifo - 2010
Usually, groups increase their productivity by the specialization of their group members. In these cases, group output is no longer simply a sum of individual outputs. We analyze contests with group-specific public goods that allow for different degrees of complementarity between group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511604
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The Value of Non-Binding Announcements in Public Goods Experiments: Some Theory and Experimental Evidence
Berlemann, Michael; Dittrich, Marcus; Markwardt, Gunther - CESifo - 2004
In this paper we present three simple theoretical models to explain the influence of the possibility to make non-binding announcements on investment behaviour in public goods settings. Our models build on the idea that voluntary contributions to the supply of a public good might be motivated by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094302
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Technological Determinants of the Group-Size Paradox
Kolmar, Martin; Rommeswinkel, Hendrik - CESifo - 2011
The present paper analyzes situations in which groups compete for rents. A major result in the literature has been that there are both cases where larger groups have advantages and cases where they have disadvantages. The paper provides two intuitive criteria which for groups with homogenous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008853859
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Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry
Choi, Jay Pil; Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kim, Jaesoo - CESifo - 2014
We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the same time engage in contest with fellow group members to appropriate the possible reward. We introduce within group power asymmetry and complementarity in members’ efforts, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011103399
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Politics and IMF Conditionality
Dreher, Axel; Sturm, Jan-Egbert; Vreeland, James Raymond - CESifo - 2013
Bailouts sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are famous for their conditionality: in return for continued installments of desperately needed loans, governments must comply with austere policy changes. Many have suggested, however, that politically important countries face rather...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877803
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Altruistic Punishment in Elections
Aimone, Jason A.; Butera, Luigi; Stratmann, Thomas - CESifo - 2014
understanding of this form of costly punishment to help explain a puzzle of voting behavior: why do people who are indifferent … between two potential policy outcomes of an election participate in large-scale elections when voting is costly? Using a … simple voting experiment, we show that many voters are willing to engage in voting as a form of punishment, even when voting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010888449
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Behavioral Political Economy: A Survey
Schnellenbach, Jan; Schubert, Christian - CESifo - 2014
Explaining individual behavior in politics should rely on the same motivational assumptions as explaining behavior in the market: That’s what Political Economy, understood as the application of economics to the study of political processes, is all about. In its standard variant, those who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010948848