same time increases competition. As a result, the platform lowers the firm fees and raises the consumer charges. In … competition. In this case, the platform raises both the charge to the consumers and the fee for the firms. …

In this paper we model the commercial lobbying industry (such as the so-called K-Street lobbyists of Washington, D ….C.). In contrast to classical special interest groups commercial lobbying firms are not directly motivated by policy outcomes … firms exist, and their implications for social welfare. We find that in a simple general equilibrium framework the market …

studies how lobbying by both groups shapes the government’s policy. We find that downtown retailers typically have steeper … lobbying contribution schedules than superstores, which induces the government to underprice central roads and parking spaces …, extending the model to allow for lobbying by residents within the downtown retail district we find that residents may lobby for …

This paper sheds light on an empirical controversy about the effect of competition on price discrimination. We … shows that whether competition has a positive or negative effect on price dispersion depends on the level of demand …

dynamic model of commercial lobbying in which citizens may hire lobbyists to present policy proposals on their behalf to … unverifiable information provision and allow a solution to their contracting problem. The welfare implications of these …’s information problem and financial contributions may actually improve social welfare in comparison to the full information outcome. …