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External Sovereign Debt in a Monetary Union: Bailouts and the Role of Corruption

Achury, Carolina; Koulovatianos, Christos; Tsoukalas, … - CESifo - 2011

We build a tractable stylized model of external sovereign debt and endogenous international interest rates. In corrupt economies with rent-seeking groups stealing public resources, a politico-economic equilibrium is characterized by permanent fiscal impatience which leads to excessive issuing of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009228617

A Model of Strategic Delegation in Contests between Groups

Brandauer, Stefan; Englmaier, Florian - CESifo - 2006

We analyze a contest between two groups where group members have differing valuations for the contested rent. Generically the pivotal group member with the median valuation of the rent will not act himself but will want to send a group member that has preferences different to her own into the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406314

International Environmental Agreements with Uncertainty, Learning and Risk Aversion

Finus, Michael; Pintassilgo, Pedro; Ulph, Alistair - CESifo - 2014

role of learning and risk aversion. It bridges two strands of literature: one focused on the role learning for the success … aversion on IEA formation under no learning. Combining learning and risk aversion seems appropriate as the uncertainties … has to be qualified: below a threshold level of risk aversion learning can impact positively on the success of IEAs, above …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010736746

A Strategic R&D Investment with Flexible Development Time in Real Option Game Analysis

Villani, Giovanni - CESifo - 2009

The real option theory provides a useful tool to evaluate an R&D investment under uncertainty because, unlike the NPV (Net Present Value), it considers the managerial flexibility that may be expand the investment opportunity value. However, most R&D investment projects are open to competing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005013067

Elections and Market Provision of Information

Bruns, Christian - CESifo - 2013

Economists usually think that rational voters have little incentives to acquire costly information. We present a theoretical model to show that, in contrast to this widely held belief, rational voters acquire considerable amounts of information if media technology is available because then they...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877742

Voting as a Signaling Device

Aytimur, R. Emre; Boukouras, Aristotelis; Schwager, Robert - CESifo - 2012

In this paper, citizens vote in order to influence the election outcome and in order to signal their unobserved characteristics to others. The model is one of rational voting and generates the following predictions: (i) The paradox of not voting does not arise, because the benefit of voting does...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009416121

Generalizations of the General Lotto and Colonel Blotto Games

Kovenock, Dan J.; Roberson, Brian - CESifo - 2015

In this paper, we generalize the General Lotto game and the Colonel Blotto game to allow for battlefield valuations that are heterogeneous across battlefields and asymmetric across players, and for the players to have asymmetric resource constraints. We completely characterize Nash equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011242157

On a Three-Alternative Condorcet Jury Theorem

Goertz, Johanna; Maniquet, Francois - CESifo - 2011

We investigate whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in a large election with three alternatives. The environment is the same as in the Condorcet Jury Theorem (Condorcet (1785)). Voters have common preferences that depend on the unknown state of nature, and they...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009021241

The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks

Dan Kovenock J.; Roberson, Brian; Sheremeta, Roman M. - CESifo - 2010

This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker’s objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender’s objective is diametrically opposed. We apply two benchmark contest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671693

Heterogeneity in Rent-Seeking Contests with Multiple Stages: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Hörtnagl, Tanja; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Stracke, Rudi; … - CESifo - 2013

This paper investigates how heterogeneity in contestants’ investment costs affects the competition intensity in a dynamic elimination contest. Theory predicts that the absolute level of investment costs has no effect on the competition intensity in homogeneous interactions. Relative cost...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010701084

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