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Equity as a Prerequisite for Stable Cooperation in a Public-Good Economy - The Core Revisited

Buchholz, Wolfgang; Peters, Wolfgang - CESifo - 2010

on the one hand and the core property of an allocation on the other. In particular we show that it is an inhomogeneous … sacrifice”) which is derived from the egalitarian-equivalent concept suggested by Moulin (1987). We also develop a simple core … test by which it can be checked whether a given allocation is in the core thus being a possible outcome of a cooperative …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596567

Core-stable Rings in Auctions with Independent Private Values

Biran, Omer; Forges, Francoise - CESifo - 2010

) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583724

Investment Uncertainty, and Production Games

Flåm, Sjur Didrik; Ermoliev, Yuri - CESifo - 2004

scale such games are quite tractable in analysis, computation, and realization. A core imputation comes in terms of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405922

Spillover Effects of Minimum Wages: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Dittrich, Marcus; Knabe, Andreas; Leipold, Kristina - CESifo - 2011

We study the spillover effects of minimum wages in a laboratory experiment. In a bilateral firm-worker bargaining setting, we find that the introduction of a minimum wage exerts upward pressure on wages even if the minimum wage is too low to be a binding restriction. Furthermore, raising the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009294100

Equitable Representation in the Councils of the United Nations: Theory and Application

Gould, Matthew; Rablen, Matthew - CESifo - 2013

We develop a theoretical framework for equity in council voting games (CVGs). In a CVG, a fully representative voting body delegates decision-making to a subset of the members, as describes, e.g., the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Three equity concepts are proposed: ex-ante...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010723541

Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations

Forges, Francoise; Salomon, Antoine - CESifo - 2014

Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010752435

Bargaining with a Residual Claimant: An Experimental Study

Embrey, Matthew; Hyndman, Kyle; Riedl, Arno - CESifo - 2014

We experimentally investigate a bargaining environment in which players negotiate over a fixed payment to one player, while the other player receives the residual from a random pie realization after subtracting the fixed payment. Contrary to the intuition that risk exposure is detrimental, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011086455

Moral Hazard and Bargaining over Incentive Contracts

Dittrich, Marcus; Städter, Silvio - CESifo - 2014

This paper analyses bargaining over an incentive compatible contract in a moral hazard framework. We introduce the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution and compare the outcome with the commonly applied Nash solution. Whether worker’s effort is higher in the Nash or the Kalai-Smorodinsky...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877973

Reform of the United Nations Security Council: Equity and Efficiency

Gould, Matthew; Rablen, Matthew D. - CESifo - 2014

Twenty years of negotiations over reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are yet to bear fruit. We use recent advances in the theory of a-priori voting power to present a formal quantitative appraisal of the “structural reforms” contained within eleven current reform proposals,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010779411

The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities

Forges, Francoise - CESifo - 2006

The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with private information is the (standard) core of a … incentive compatible core can be empty, even if utility functions are quasi-linear. If, in addition to quasi-linearity, further … assumptions are made (like independent private values), the non-emptiness of the core follows nevertheless from d’Aspremont and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765690