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Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry
Choi, Jay Pil; Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kim, Jaesoo - CESifo - 2014
We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the … asymmetry and complementarity in members’ efforts, and analyze how each group’s internal conflict in-fluences its chance of … winning in the external conflict. We find that a more symmetric group may expend more effort in external conflict when the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011103399
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Leaders as Role Models for the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods
Gaechter, Simon; Renner, Elke - CESifo - 2014
We investigate the link between leadership, beliefs and pro-social behavior. This link is interesting because field evidence suggests that people’s behavior in domains like charitable giving, tax evasion, corporate culture and corruption is influenced by leaders (CEOs, politicians) and beliefs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010948862
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Tipping versus Cooperating to Supply a Public Good
Barrett, Scott; Dannenberg, Astrid - CESifo - 2015
In some important multi-player situations, such as efforts to supply a global public good, players can choose the game they want to play. In this paper we conduct an experimental test of the decision to choose between a “tipping” game, in which every player wants to contribute to the public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011210784
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Minimum Participation Rules for the Provision of Public Goods
Gerber, Anke; Neitzel, Jakob; Wichardt, Philipp Christoph - CESifo - 2012
This paper considers the endogenous formation of an institution to provide a public good. If the institution governs only its members, players have an incentive to free ride on the institution formation of others and the social dilemma is simply shifted to a higher level. Addressing this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009645648
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On the Private Provision of Contentious Public Characteristics
Cornes, Richard; Rübbelke, Dirk - CESifo - 2012
We extend the standard public good provision model to allow players to either like or dislike the public characteristic. Those who dislike it are able to take actions to reduce its level. We present conditions under which the existence of a unique noncooperative equilibrium is retained, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010556850
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On the Efficient Provision of Public Goods by Means of Lotteries
Franke, Jörg; Leininger, Wolfgang - CESifo - 2013
We provide a solution to the free-rider problem in the provision of a public good. To this end we define a biased indirect contribution game which provides the efficient amount of the public good in non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. No confiscatory taxes or other means of coercion are used. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010610087
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Reciprocity Networks and the Participation Problem
Dufwenberg, Martin; Patel, Amrish - CESifo - 2014
Reciprocity can be a powerful motivation for human behaviour. Scholars argue that it is relevant in the context of private provision of public goods. We examine whether reciprocity can resolve the associated coordination problem. The interaction of reciprocity with cost-sharing is critical....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010812485
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Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations
Forges, Francoise; Salomon, Antoine - CESifo - 2014
Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010752435
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Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Good Experiments
Fischbacher, Urs; Gaechter, Simon - CESifo - 2008
We provide a test of the role of social preferences and beliefs in voluntary cooperation and its decline. We elicit individuals’ cooperation preferences in one experiment and use them – as well as subjects’ elicited beliefs – to explain contributions to a public good played repeatedly....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765860
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Negotiating to Avoid "Gradual" versus "Dangerous" Climate Change: An Experimental Test of Two Prisoners' Dilemma
Barrett, Scott; Dannenberg, Astrid - CESifo - 2014
According to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, global collective action is needed to stabilize “greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous [our emphasis] anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” The Framework Convention thus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010734324