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Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry

Choi, Jay Pil; Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kim, Jaesoo - CESifo - 2014

We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the … asymmetry and complementarity in members’ efforts, and analyze how each group’s internal conflict in-fluences its chance of … winning in the external conflict. We find that a more symmetric group may expend more effort in external conflict when the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011103399

Tipping versus Cooperating to Supply a Public Good

Barrett, Scott; Dannenberg, Astrid - CESifo - 2015

In some important multi-player situations, such as efforts to supply a global public good, players can choose the game they want to play. In this paper we conduct an experimental test of the decision to choose between a “tipping” game, in which every player wants to contribute to the public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011210784

Negotiating to Avoid "Gradual" versus "Dangerous" Climate Change: An Experimental Test of Two Prisoners' Dilemma

Barrett, Scott; Dannenberg, Astrid - CESifo - 2014

According to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, global collective action is needed to stabilize “greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous [our emphasis] anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” The Framework Convention thus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010734324

Reciprocity Networks and the Participation Problem

Dufwenberg, Martin; Patel, Amrish - CESifo - 2014

Reciprocity can be a powerful motivation for human behaviour. Scholars argue that it is relevant in the context of private provision of public goods. We examine whether reciprocity can resolve the associated coordination problem. The interaction of reciprocity with cost-sharing is critical....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010812485

Efficiency, Welfare, and Political Competition

Bierbrauer, Felix; Boyer, Pierre C. - CESifo - 2014

We study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about their preferences. Our framework covers models of income taxation, public-goods provision or publicly provided private goods. Politicians are vote-share-maximizers. They can propose any policy that is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010779412

Leaders as Role Models for the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods

Gaechter, Simon; Renner, Elke - CESifo - 2014

We investigate the link between leadership, beliefs and pro-social behavior. This link is interesting because field evidence suggests that people’s behavior in domains like charitable giving, tax evasion, corporate culture and corruption is influenced by leaders (CEOs, politicians) and beliefs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010948862

On the Sensitivity of Collective Action to Uncertainty about Climate Tipping Points

Barrett, Scott; Dannenberg, Astrid - CESifo - 2014

Previous research shows that collective action to avoid a catastrophic threshold, such as a climate “tipping point,” is unaffected by uncertainty about the impact of crossing the threshold but that collective action collapses if the location of the threshold is uncertain. Theory suggests...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743452

Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations

Forges, Francoise; Salomon, Antoine - CESifo - 2014

Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010752435

Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Good Experiments

Fischbacher, Urs; Gaechter, Simon - CESifo - 2008

We provide a test of the role of social preferences and beliefs in voluntary cooperation and its decline. We elicit individuals’ cooperation preferences in one experiment and use them – as well as subjects’ elicited beliefs – to explain contributions to a public good played repeatedly....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765860

Minimum Participation Rules for the Provision of Public Goods

Gerber, Anke; Neitzel, Jakob; Wichardt, Philipp Christoph - CESifo - 2012

This paper considers the endogenous formation of an institution to provide a public good. If the institution governs only its members, players have an incentive to free ride on the institution formation of others and the social dilemma is simply shifted to a higher level. Addressing this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009645648