Showing 1 - 10 of 22
We present a model to test the null hypothesis that firms organize their corporate governancearrangements optimally given the constraints they face. Following the literature, the modelrejects the null if the conditional correlation between governance and performance issignificantly different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249564
work for. We reject, however, the efficient pay hypothesis as CEO pay and the demand for managers increases in Germany in … difficult times when the typical firm size shrinks. We find further that domestic and global competition for managers has …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009653374
We analyze the optimal ownership, delegation and compensation structures when a manager is hired to run a firm and to gather information on investment projects. The initial owner has two tasks: monitoring the manager and supervising project choice. Optimality would require a large ownership...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596583
findings suggest that, when managers engage in wasteful capital expenditures, welfare may decline if the cost of investment is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010732350
We derive determinants of tax avoidance by means of a multi-task principal-agent model. We extend prevailing models by integrating both corporate and individual income taxation as well as by including tax planning effort in the agent’s action portfolio. Our model shows novel and apparently...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010786744
model with strategic interaction between managers and outside shareholders, we hypothesize that, while an increase in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010701082
By studying the gap between the discount rates used by executives and shareholders, we assess the extent to which governance problems distort firm behavior. The estimation strategy recovers discount rates used by executives from the pattern of their actual investment spending. Our empirical work...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765749
can limit the interference of the large shareholder and can restore manager’s incentive to exert effort to become informed …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765820
This paper presents a positive model which shows that institutional setups on capital and labor markets might be intertwined by politicoeconomic forces. Some countries especially in continental Europe exhibit a corporatist politicoeconomic equilibrium with a substantial protection of insiders on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766256
Incentive compensation induces correlation between the portfolio of managers and the cash flow of the firms they manage …. This correlation exposes managers to risk and hence gives them an incentive to hedge against the poor performance of their … using financial markets and shareholders cannot perfectly monitor the manager’s portfolio in order to keep him from hedging …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094243