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Social Relations and Relational Incentives

Dur, Robert; Tichem, Jan - CESifo - 2012

This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877789

Information Asymmetry, Education Signals and the Case of Ethnic and Native Germans

Hornig, Stephan O.; Rottmann, Horst; Wapler, Rüdiger - CESifo - 2009

This paper analyses the effects of education signals for Ethnic Germans and Germans without a migration background (“Native Germans”). We base our analysis on a sorting model with productivity enhancing effects of education. We compare whether the signalling value differs between the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005034643

Apprenticeship, Vocational Training and Early Labor Market Outcomes - in East and West Germany

Riphahn, Regina T.; Zibrowius, Michael - CESifo - 2015

We study the returns to apprenticeship and vocational training for three early labor market outcomes all measured at age 25 for East and West German youths: non-employment (i.e., unemployment or out of the labor force), permanent fulltime employment, and wages. We find strong positive effects of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011205375

When is Ambiguity-Attitude Constant?

Eichberger, Jürgen; Grant, Simon; Kelsey, David - CESifo - 2012

This paper studies how updating affects ambiguity-attitude. In particular we focus on the generalized Bayesian update of the Jaffray-Phillipe sub-class of Choquet Expected Utility preferences. We find conditions for ambiguity-attitude to be the same before and after updating. A necessary and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010539152

First Impressions Matter: Signalling as a Source of Policy Dynamics

Hansen, Stephen; McMahon, Michael - CESifo - 2012

with experience. We then reject increasing confidence in private information or learning about the structure of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010540726

Optimal Monetary Policy when Agents are Learning

Molnár, Krisztina; Santoro, Sergio - CESifo - 2010

We derive the optimal monetary policy in a sticky price model when private agents follow adaptive learning. We show … order to facilitate private sector learning and thus ease the future intratemporal inflation-output gap trade-offs. The … policy recommendation is robust: the welfare loss entailed by the optimal policy under learning if the private sector …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596587

Rationality, Irrationality and Economic Cognition

Whalley, John - CESifo - 2005

. Learning played a major role in individuals achieving what was referred to as complete rationality. I draw on these ideas, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094429

On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox

Alós-Ferrer, Carlos; Kirchsteiger, Georg; Walzl, Markus - CESifo - 2007

We study competition among market designers who create new trading platforms, when boundedly rational traders learn to select among them. We ask whether efficient platforms, leading to market - clearing trading outcomes, will dominate the market in the long run. If several market designers are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406426

Carbon Prices for the Next Hundred Years

Gerlagh, Reyer; Liski, Matti - CESifo - 2014

World income grows fast without verifiable climate-change impacts on the economy. The growth spell can end if climate impacts turn real but this can take decades to learn. We develop a tractable stochastic climate-economy model with a hidden-state impact process to evaluate the contributions of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010747216

Compliance Dynamics Generated by Social Interaction Rules

Lipatov, Vilen - CESifo - 2014

We study compliance dynamics generated by a large set of behavioral rules describing social interaction in a population of agents facing an enforcement authority. When the authority adjusts the auditing probability every period, cycling in cheating-auditing occurs: Intensive monitoring induces...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010764298