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Imperfect Competition, General Equilibrium and Unemployment

Gersbach, Hans; Schniewind, Achim - CESifo - 1999

We analyze whether different learning abilities of firms with respect to general equilibrium effects lead to different levels of unemployment. We consider a general equilibrium model where firms in one sector compete à la Cournot and a real wage rigidity leads to unemployment. If firms consider...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766055

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

Theilen, Bernd - CESifo - 2008

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analyzed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm’s hierarchy. In this paper, a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405811

The Effects of Disclosure Regulation of an Innovative Firm

Jansen, Jos - CESifo - 2005

A firm actively manages its rival’s beliefs by disclosing and concealing information on the size of its process innovation. The firm’s disclosure strategy results from the trade-off between two effects on product market incentives. First, the firm’s competitor learns that the firm is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406251

Short Run Effects of Bleaker Prospects for Oligopolistic Producers of a Non-Renewable Resource

Grimsrud, Kristine; Rosendahl, Knut Einar; Storrøsten, … - CESifo - 2014

In a non-renewable resource market with imperfect competition, both the resource rent and current prices influence a large resource owner’s optimal supply. New information regarding future market conditions that affect the resource rent will consequently impact current supply. Bleaker demand...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010734335

Bribery vs. Extortion: Allowing the Lesser of two Evils

Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques; Yun, Sungho - CESifo - 2007

Rewards to prevent supervisors from accepting bribes create incentives for extortion. This raises the question whether a supervisor who can engage in bribery and extortion can still be useful in providing incentives. By highlighting the role of team work in forging information, we present a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765652

Social Capital and Collusion: The Case of Merchant Guilds

Dessí, Roberta; Olgivie, Sheilagh - CESifo - 2003

Merchant guilds have been portrayed as “social networks“ that generated beneficial “social capital“ by sustaining shared norms, effectively transmitting information, and successfully undertaking collective action. This social capital, it is claimed, benefited society as a whole by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765797

Optimal Regulation of Auditing

Pagano, Marco; Immordino, Giovanni - CESifo - 2007

firms and in the amount of funding they seek. The model can encompass collusion between clients and auditors, arising from … the joint provision of auditing and consulting services: deflecting collusion requires less ambitious standards. Finally …, banning the provision of consulting services by auditors eliminates collusion but may not be optimal in the presence of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765804

Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information

Vives, Xavier - CESifo - 2009

A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of the sellers have uncertain common and private value components and there is no exogenous noise in the system. A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008534061

Behavioral Economics as Applied to Firms: A Primer

Armstrong, Mark; Huck, Steffen - CESifo - 2010

We discuss the literatures on behavioral economics, bounded rationality and experimental economics as they apply to firm behaviour in markets. Topics discussed include the impact of imitative and satisficing behavior by firms, outcomes when managers care about their position relative to peers,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008572583

Auctions and Corruption

Lengwiler, Yvan; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - CESifo - 2000

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181379