We find experimental evidence that the decision problem of tax compliance changes if subjects’ declarations are not … picture looks more trustworthy than average. Depending on these beliefs, they may adjust their compliance decisions. Our …

cheating-auditing occurs: Intensive monitoring induces compliance, but with high compliance there is incentive for lax … monitoring; with less monitoring, compliance starts decreasing, and then there is an incentive to intensify monitoring. Thus, the …We study compliance dynamics generated by a large set of behavioral rules describing social interaction in a population …

We run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to enforce compliance with the law … mailings, leading to a substantial increase in compliance. Among different mailing conditions a legal threat that stresses a … information about others’ behavior enhances compliance. However, the information condition has a positive effect in municipalities …

When a principal’s monitoring information is private (non-verifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal …, when rescaling is feasible, private monitoring is more efficient than public monitoring subject to collusion because non …

unemployed to front-load search effort prior to monitoring. This causes the job finding rate to increase above the post sanction …

. Finally, as an extension, we endogenize intermediation, in the form of monitoring, and show that it may be oversupplied in …

An authority delegates a monitoring task to an agent. It can only observe the number of detected offenders, but neither … the monitoring intensity chosen by the agent nor the resulting level of misbehavior. We provide a necessary and sufficient … condition for the implementability of monitoring policies. Typically, several monitoring intensities give rise to the same …

job search is verified. The threat of monitoring increases transitions to employment, but of lower quality. In the less …